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Jeffrey Fagan

ABSTRACT
Equilibrium models of racial discrimination in law enforcement encounters suggest that in the
absence of racial discrimination, the proportion of searches yielding evidence of illegal activity
(the hit rate) will be equal across races. Searches that disproportionately target one racial group,
resulting in a relatively low hit rate, are inefficient and suggest bias. An unbiased officer who is
seeking to maximize her hit rate would reduce the number of unproductive stops toward a group
with the lower hit rate. An unbiased policing regime would generate no differences in hit rates
between groups.
We use this framework to test for racial discrimination in pedestrian stops with data from the
contentious “Stop, Question and Frisk” (SQF) program of the New York City Police Department
(NYPD). SQF produced nearly five million citizen stops from 2004–2012. The stops are regulated
by both Terry (federal) and DeBour (New York) case law on reasonable suspicion. Stops are welldocumented, including a structured format for reporting the indicia of reasonable suspicion that
motivated the stop. We exploit these data to examine the Floyd court’s claim. We decompose
stops on the basis of suspicion, as reported by officers at the time of the stop. We conduct five
tests to assess whether racial discrimination characterizes SQF stops: the allocation of officers
relative to crime and population in specific areas, the decision to sanction conditional on a stop,
the decision to arrest or issue a summons conditional on the decision to sanction, the efficiency of
stops in seizing contraband including weapons, and updating processes by officers in their search
activity. In each test, we include the reasonable suspicion rationale that officers indicated as the
basis of the stop. We find consistent evidence of disparities in police responses to Black, Hispanic,
and Black Hispanic civilians, and significant differences by race in the use of specific indicia of
reasonable suspicion that motivate stops. The higher error rates for specific indicia of suspicion
suggest that rather than individualized bases of suspicion, officers may be activating stereotypes
and archetypes to articulate suspicion and justify street seizures.
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“The best thing for someone to do when being stopped is
cooperate. Accept it as a fact of urban life, and that it overall is
helping to keep New York City safe.”
–New York City Police Commissioner Ray Kelly1
INTRODUCTION
Racially selective law enforcement, or racial profiling by police, has been a
contentious topic in both law and empirical research for decades. Not only have
the ethical and constitutional implications of profiling been sharply contested,2 but
evidence of its efficacy in reducing crime—after accounting for other enforcement
efforts or particular police tactics—is inconsistent and often contradictory.3 In
the wider debate on selective enforcement, questions of efficacy and other
distributive criteria are intertwined with constitutional concerns on privacy and
equality, as well as with normative questions on dignity and democratic inclusion.4
These considerations are further complicated by policy and strategic features
of contemporary policing. Since the 1990s, new developments in policing have
emphasized proactive or preemptive police tactics focused on high crime areas and

1.
2.

3.

4.

Radio Rookies, The Effect of Stop-and-Frisk in the Bronx, WNYC, at 6:17–6:29 (Aug. 31, 2012),
http://www.wnyc.org/story/232447-radio-rookies-kelly [https://perma.cc/ 8CRY-H7PH].
Annabelle Lever, Racial Profiling and the Political Philosophy of Race, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY AND RACE (Naomi Zack ed., 2016) (arguing that racial profiling
reproduces inequalities through hierarchies of power and privilege based on skin color and
justifies liberty incursions by the state based on the characteristics of the group to which they
(appear to) belong and their association with crime; stating that crime contributes to, and
reflects, racial inequality). But see Mathias Risse & Richard Zeckhauser, Racial Profiling, 32
PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 131, 149–50 (2004) (arguing that a welfarist model and a “lesser of evils”
analysis justifies racial profiling). Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the
Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 164–
65 (2015) (arguing that the practice of stop and frisk is carried out by an officer in an individual
incident but by a police force en masse as a program of group policing).
Compare, e.g., David Weisburd, Alese Wooditch, Sarit Weisburd & Sue-Ming Yang, Do Stop,
Question, and Frisk Practices Deter Crime?, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 31 (2016), with John
MacDonald, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, The Effects of Local Police Surges on Crime and
Arrests in New York City, 11 PLOS ONE 1 (2016).
See Steven N. Durlauf, Assessing Racial Profiling, 116 ECON. J. F402 (2006); Ekow N. Yankah,
Pretext and Justification: Republicanism, Policing, and Race, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1543 (2019);
Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054
(2017).
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places with recurring criminal activity.5 Often, these new tactics included a broad
application of the “investigative stop” or “field interrogation” police power that
was first addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio.6 This power has
been further delineated in a series of Supreme Court cases through several decades
generally to shrink the rights of civilians in police encounters. New policing tactics
have expanded the scope of pedestrian or vehicle stops based on individualized
suspicion, as envisioned by the Terry Court, turning such stops into wholesale
programmatic efforts aimed at maximizing police effectiveness.7
The Terry Court created the jurisprudential and institutional space for the
programmatic exercise of the police stop power through a standard of
individualized and articulable suspicion that gave wide leeway to police officers.
Suspicion was operationalized as the perception and belief of a “reasonable police
officer”8 that “crime was afoot.”9 Such suspicion—no matter how little or how
much, or of what type—justified a seizure or temporary detention, so long as it was
articulable.10 Justice Douglas, in dissent, termed this standard “reasonable
suspicion,” noting the uncertainty of the facts that would justify a “seizure”

5.

6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

See Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407 (2000); Debra Livingston,
Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New
Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997); Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through
Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing the limitations of “retail”
litigation under § 1983 and other individual cases to produce institutional reform in policing
and arguing for the stronger, institutionally focused mechanisms of 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to
produce meaningful institutional changes). See also NAT’L ACADS. SCIS., ENG’G, & MED.,
PROACTIVE POLICING (David Weisburd & Malay K. Majmundar eds., 2018).
392 U.S. 1 (1968) (upholding the forcible detention (stops) and searches (frisks) of civilians on
less than the Fourth Amendment standard or probable cause). See Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio
at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L. REV. 423 (2004).
See Meares, supra note 2; Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality
and Effectiveness of New York City “Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495 (2014); Aziz Z. Huq,
The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban
Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397 (2017).
Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (stating that the officer had “reasonable grounds to believe that defendant
was armed and dangerous”).
Id. at 5 (authorizing stops and searches “[w]here police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot
and that person with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous.”).
Id. at 30 (“We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot
and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous . . . he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search
of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him.”).
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without a warrant.”11 Questions about the proper bases for street and vehicular
stops have persisted in the 50 years since Terry and have taken on new urgency in
the past decade. This new urgency is driven by two developments: growing
evidence of patterns of injuries and fatalities to civilians in police encounters,12 and
racialized patterns of stops, searches, and police use of force in those encounters.13
We use this framework to test for racial discrimination in pedestrian stops
with data from the contentious “Stop, Question and Frisk” (SQF) program of the
New York City Police Department (NYPD). The stops are regulated by both Terry
(federal) and DeBour (New York) case law on reasonable suspicion. SQF
produced nearly five million citizen stops from 2004–2012.14 A 2013 federal
district court opinion, Floyd et al. v. City of New York, held that the conduct of these
SQF encounters violated both the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments,15
concluding that the practice amounted to “indirect profiling” coded in terms of the
reasonable suspicion rationale for the stop.16
We exploit these data to interrogate the Floyd court’s claim. We assess
whether these second order signals that crime is afoot, the indicia of suspicion that
animate stops, meet Professor Reginald Williams’ challenge on the accuracy of
those signals.17 In fact, the evidence in this Article shows they do not, and in turn
produces social and legal harms in the form of street detentions that risk both loss
of liberty and risks of physical injury. We conduct five tests to assess whether racial
discrimination infects SQF stops: the allocation of officers relative to crime and
population in specific areas, the decision to sanction conditional on a stop, the

11.
12.

13.

14.

15.
16.
17.

Id. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The term ‘probable cause’ rings a bell of certainty that is not
sounded by phrases such as ‘reasonable suspicion.’ Moreover, the meaning of ‘probable cause’
is deeply imbedded in our constitutional history.”).
See, e.g., Alexandra T. Bourdillon, Parsa P. Salehi, Jonathan Y. Lee, Benjamin Steren, Kevin Y.
Pei & Yan Ho Lee, Demographic, Clinical, and Mortality Trends of Law Enforcement-Related
Trauma: A Trauma Quality Improvement Program Analysis, 156 JAMA SURGERY 685 (2021);
see also Bindu Kalesan, Jeffrey J. Siracuse, Alan Cook, Mattia Prosperi, Jeffrey Fagan & Sandro
Galea, Prevalence and Hospital Charges From Firearm Injuries Treated in US Emergency
Departments From 2006 to 2016, 169 SURGERY 1188 (2021).
See, e.g., Emma Pierson, Camelia Simoiu, Jan Overgoor, Sam Corbett-Davies, Daniel Jenson,
Amy Shoemaker, Vignesh Ramachandran, Phoebe Barghouty, Cheryl Phillips, Ravi Shroff &
Sharad Goel, A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the United
States, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 736 (2020).
See Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at *22, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) [hereinafter Fagan Report] (indicating that, of the people stopped between
2004 and 2009, 89 percent were male, 49 percent were under the age of 25, and 52 percent were
African American).
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
Id. at 562.
Reginald Williams, Risse and Zeckhauer on Racial Profiling: A Reply, 22 UTILITAS 228 (2010).
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decision to arrest or issue a summons conditional on the decision to sanction, the
efficiency of stops in seizing contraband including weapons, and updating
processes by officers in their search activity. In each test, we include the indicia of
suspicion that officers indicated as the basis of each stop. For most of the estimates,
we include benchmarks of crime and race to control for conditions that can
influence police perceptions and decision making.18 We find consistent evidence
of bias toward Blacks, Latinx, and Black Latinx persons and significant differences
by race and ethnicity in the use of the reasonable suspicion rationales that motivate
stops.
The Article proceeds through four Parts. It begins with a discussion of the
jurisprudential bases and empirical evidence on race and selective enforcement in
the new policing regimes that evolved in the past three decades.19 We chart the
evolution of the constitutional justification of “reasonable suspicion” from the
officer safety rationale in Terry to the crime control justification for stops in a series
of opinions beginning with Adams,20 just four years after Terry was decided. We
review the literature on race and selective enforcement, discussing and then
challenging the behavioral theories advanced in the past two decades to justify the
widespread use of the police stop power as articulated in Terry and its progeny.
We ask whether the empirical evidence on racial disparities in police stops suggest
that they are animated by racial bias or other utilitarian explanations for selective
enforcement.
We next present the empirical design to test for the racially selective
enforcement in the SQF regime in New York. The design is situated in the
empirical tensions in studies of disparate racial impact and disparate racial
treatment, and the challenge of incorporating the indicia of suspicion into these
tests. We identify the additional complexity of incorporating the institutional
context of the SQF practices into these tests, focusing on the allocation of officers
to neighborhoods as a contest for explaining the racial patterns of stops. We then
develop the models to test for racial components of officer allocations to local areas
that are the antecedents of the patterns of stops by officers. The design to test for
discrimination follows next, focusing on the methods to integrate race with the
factors describing reasonable suspicion in tests for disparate treatment.

18.
19.
20.

Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1620–34
(2012); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma
and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 319, 330–34 (2004).
See, e.g., Heymann, supra note 5. See also PROACTIVE POLICING: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND
COMMUNITIES (David Weisburd & Malay Majmundar eds.) (2018).
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
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The results follow in the next Part. We show that the racial composition of a
police precinct competes with local crime conditions to explain the allocation of
officers to places. We then show the components of racial disparities in stop
practices, from the decision to stop and the outcomes of those stops. Here, we
focus on the intersection of race with the components of reasonable suspicion
developed for the Floyd regime to show that the parameters of suspicion used to
justify stops themselves are racialized expressions of specific behaviors that lead to
disparate stop rates and outcomes.
We conclude a discussion of the endogeneity of race and ethnicity in the
practice of stops, creating risks for racial targeting and stigmatization that have
social costs for populations already burdened by disadvantage and discrimination.
We discuss the need and prospects for stronger constitutional regulation of stops
under the Terry doctrine and the caselaw that flowed from it, and the failure of the
construct of reasonable suspicion to cabin racial disparities. We conclude that in
effect, these categories of suspicion themselves are vehicles of discrimination by
law enforcement with little bearing on crime control and social welfare.
A.

Race, Street Stops, and Crime Control

The constitutional foundation for the stop regime as practiced in New York
and elsewhere was Terry v. Ohio.21 Terry was decided at a moment when violent
crime rates in the United States were climbing sharply,22 including civil
disturbances in nearly 50 cities.23 Terry, in effect, narrowed the jurisdiction of
Mapp v. Ohio,24 a decision of the Supreme Court that extended the due process
protections of the exclusionary rule to include all “constitutionally unreasonable
searches” that were done without a basis of probable cause.25 Rising crime rates
through the years following Mapp raised concerns, however, that the strict
application of Fourth Amendment prohibitions on search and seizure absent
probable cause had inflicted the social costs of rising crime rates and insecurity
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, Estimated Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter 1961–
68,
DISASTER
CTR.,
https://www.disastercenter.com/crime/uscrime.htm
[https://
perma.cc/6EUT-6NAZ].
Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43 (discussing the social crime and
constitutional context of the 1968 Terry opinion). See KERNER COMM’N, NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 19–60 (1968).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. See also Dallin H Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665 (1970).
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through overdeterrence of police interventions with persons suspected of criminal
activity.26
The 1968 Terry opinion “‘uncoupled . . . the two clauses of the Fourth
Amendment’” that regulated temporary detentions and searches by police by
focusing on the common practice of police officers to stop and pat down
persons on the street thought to be possibly involved in criminal activity.27
These were commonly known as “investigative stops.” This was a departure
from Mapp’s probable cause standard for investigative stops, replacing it with a
standard of “reasonable suspicion.” In what became known as Terry stops, officers
were required to state “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. The Terry
Court required only that the basis of the stop generated enough suspicion to
justify a temporary street detention but avoided stating what those standards
might be. Nor did the Terry Court say how much suspicion was needed to
justify a stop, nor what the threshold of suspicion—would be to reach the
constitutionally necessary threshold of suspicion.
Officer safety was not a primary concern of the Terry Court, although the
Court did mention that Terry stops “must be limited to that which is necessary
for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others
nearby.”28 This suggests that, despite the context of rising crime rates, public
safety, in general, was not the Court’s primary concern. The 1965 President’s
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Criminal Justice
reported that “[c]ommission observers of police streetwork in high-crime
neighborhoods of some large cities report that 10 percent of those frisked were
found to be carrying guns, and another 10 percent were carrying knives.”29
Officer deaths did rise in this period, but the Terry Court made little mention of

26.

27.
28.

29.

Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the “Costs”
of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 8 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 611 (1983); Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical
Assessment, 8 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 585 (1983); William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the
Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443 (1996).
Fagan, supra note 23, at 44.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 26. But see Carol Steiker, Terry Unbound, 82 MISS. L.J. 329 (2013) (arguing
the officer safety standard was extended four years after Terry in Adams v. Williams from the
frisk to the stop via a textual mashup of the facts of the Adams stop with the text of the Terry
opinion).
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON L. ENF’T & CRIM. JUST., CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 94–95
(1965), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6TH-HTH4].
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it.30 Yet, the reference to preventing crime more broadly than the potential harm
to the police officer conducting the frisk nowhere appears in the Court’s opinion.31
Crime control was on the minds of the Justices, but for the most part, the Terry
opinion buried that particular lede and the case was most often discussed as one
benefiting officers as much as if not more so than the benefit to the public.
The initial officer safety rationale gave way over the decades following Terry
to a crime control rationale. In the few states that developed a doctrine that
differed from Terry, the controlling opinions also incorporated both crime control
and officer safety prongs. In People v. DeBour, a New York State case that is the
controlling state case on officer investigative stops, officer safety was a less pressing
concern than was the broader public safety impetus for the pursuit and frisk of the
suspect.32 A series of Supreme Court cases starting with Adams v. Williams33 in the
1970s suggested that using the stop authority as a proactive crime control strategy
was in fact justified.
As in Terry, Adams required the Court to question the restraints of the Mapp
v. Ohio34 probable cause standard, undermine Mapp’s punitive use of the
exclusionary rule, and retell the facts of the Terry case.35 Further, Adams suggested
that the use of proactive stops was also inherent in police powers.36 Since the Court
30.

31.
32.

33.
34.
35.

36.

Fagan, supra note 23, at 57 & n.90 (noting that “[i]n the years between Mapp and Terry, total
officer deaths (not just those resulting from felony crimes by suspects) increased from 140 in
1961 to 191 in 1968. In the decade after Terry, as violent crime overall increased, officer deaths
increased from 194 in 1969 to 2015 in 1978 with a peak of 280 in 1974.” (citing Officer Deaths
by Year, NAT’L L. ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MEMORIAL FUND)).
Id. at 31. Justice Rehnquist continued this conflation of stop and frisk rationales in Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). See also Steiker, supra note 28.
40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976). De Bour and two police officers were walking toward each other just
after midnight; when the officers and De Bour were within “30 or 40 feet" of each other. Id. at
213. The officer asked De Bour for identification; De Bour said he had none. One officer then
“noticed a slight waist-high bulge in [De Bour’s] jacket [and] . . . asked De Bour to unzipper his
coat. When De Bour complied . . . [the officer] observed a revolver protruding from [De
Bour’s] waistband.” Id.
407 U.S. 143 (1972).
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (extending the due process protections of the exclusionary rule to
include all “constitutionally unreasonable searches” that were done without a basis of probable
cause).
See Adams, 407 U.S. at 145 (lowering standard of reliability necessary for information used to
justify a stop and frisk, in effect permitting an arrest without probable cause in the search for
possessory crimes). See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 23, at 43, 84 (noting that Terry’s deference to
subjective assessments of suspicion invited officers to use their authority to conduct stops
based on “hunches,” and lowering Mapp’s probable cause standard and its exclusionary
punishment). See also Rachel A. Harmon & Andrew Manns, Proactive Policing and the Legacy
of Terry, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 49 (2017).
Jorge E. Galva, Christopher Atchison & Samuel Levey, Public Health Strategy and the Police
Powers of the State, 120 PUB. HEALTH REPS., SUPPLEMENT 20 (2005) (“The application of police
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decided Adams, its decisions have incrementally extended the constitutionality
of Terry stops beyond those narrow governmental interests of officer safety to a
broader range of routine police street detentions. This line of cases has worked to
expand the officer safety rationale broader crime control rationale animating
Terry stops.37 For example, the Michigan v. Summers38 majority concluded: “that
the exception for limited intrusions [in border cases] that may be justified by
special law enforcement interests is not confined to the momentary, on-the-street
detention accompanied by a frisk for weapons involved in Terry and Adams.”
Terry’s crime control prong continued to be extended in a one-way ratchet in
a succession of cases, concluding with Whren v. United States in 1996,39 and Utah
v. Strieff in 2016.40 Through the progression of these cases, race moved from the
periphery of the jurisprudence to the core of the tensions on how the police effect
“seizures” under the Fourth Amendment. In an act of what Andrew Taslitz called
“willful racial blindsight,” race was a minor concern in the original Terry opinion
but became explicit as concerns of racial disparity grew over the ensuing decades.41

37.
38.

39.

40.

41.

power has traditionally implied a capacity to (1) promote the public health, morals, or safety,
and the general wellbeing of the community; (2) enact and enforce laws for the promotion of
the general welfare; (3) regulate private rights in the public interest; and (4) extend measures to
all great public needs.”).
Fagan, supra note 23, at 60.
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981). The Court stated:
In assessing the justification for the detention of an occupant of premises being
searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant, both the law enforcement
interest and the nature of the “articulable facts” supporting the detention are
relevant. Most obvious is the legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing
flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found. Less obvious, but
sometimes of greater importance, is the interest in minimizing the risk of harm
to the officers.
Id. at 702–03.
517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that a temporary detention of a motorist based on probable
cause of violation of a traffic law does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable seizures, and allowing stops based on subjective intentions such as race in
“ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment” claims).
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). See Jackson D. Wagner, Stop and Exploit: What Remains
of the Constitutional Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures After Strieff, 56
WASHBURN L.J. 383 (2017); Julian A. Cook III, The Wrong Decision at the Wrong Time: Utah
v. Strieff in the Era of Aggressive Policing, 70 SMU L. REV. 293 (2017); Guy Padula, Utah v.
Strieff: Lemonade Stands and Dragnet Policing, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 469 (2017) (linking the
police killings of Michael Brown and Philando Castile to aggressive police detentions based on
racial cues).
Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity of Color-Blind Criminal Justice, 5 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 1 (2007). See generally R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the
Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2003) (showing the disproportionate focus on drug use and
other drug crimes on Black and other nonwhite groups. See generally Samuel R. Gross & Debra
Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002) (reporting
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In fact, race was largely scrubbed from the logic and language of the Terry opinion
itself, only to be buried decades later in the dicta of the police power in Whren.42
The widespread use of that power raised both normative tensions and
questions of constitutional regulation. Mathias Risse and Richard
Zeckhauser43 are perhaps the most forthcoming in arguing that the productivity of
profiling strategies in controlling crime justifies the use of race in the selection of
individuals for field detentions and searches.44 Their assumptions reflect base rate
considerations of differential crime propensity and participation by race and
have been translated into probability statements regarding the fairness of police
behavior relative to welfarist considerations of crime-deterrence tradeoffs.45
Dominitz, for example, would justify racially-selective enforcement or racial
preferences for stops by comparing the harms of this form of discrimination with
other harms that might accrue from the pursuit of simple racial equality in stops:
given the spatial and demographic patterns of crime, underenforcement in high
crime, predominantly minority areas, would expose the understopped population

42.

43.
44.

45.

consistent evidence of racially imbalanced highway and street stops of individuals based on
suspicion of drug crimes and other misdemeanor and felony offenses). See also Kevin R.
Johnson, Racial Profiling After September 11: The Department of Justice’s 2003 Guidelines, 50
LOY. L. REV. 67 (2004); Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Sentencing, Policing, and
Punishing in an Actuarial Age (Univ. Chi. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 94,
2005).
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (rejecting a discrimination claim as
valid under the Fourth Amendment, stating “the constitutional basis for objecting to
intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth
Amendment analysis.”).
Risse & Zeckhauser, supra note 2.
Even assuming racial differences in base rates, deterrence theories argue against using racial
preferences to realize crime control. See Harcourt, supra note 41. See Jack Glaser, The Efficacy
and Effect of Racial Profiling: A Mathematical Simulation Approach, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 395 (2006) (rejecting the empirical justification for assuming racially imbalanced
crime rates to justify imbalanced police street and highway stops). See also Amy A. Hackney
& Jack Glaser, Reverse Deterrence in Racial Profiling: Increased Transgressions by Nonprofiled
Whites, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 348 (2013) (reporting results of an experiment showing that
disproportionate scrutiny of minorities by sanctioning authorities including police would have
“reverse deterrent” effects on the illicit behavior of members of non-profiled groups). See
generally Charles F. Manski & Daniel S. Nagin, Assessing Benefits, Costs, and Disparate Racial
Impacts of Confrontational Proactive Policing, 114 PNAS 9308 (2017).
Jeff Dominitz, How Do the Laws of Probability Constrain Legislative and Judicial Efforts to Stop
Racial Profiling?, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 412 (2003); Durlauf, supra note 4; David Bjerk, Racial
Profiling, Statistical Discrimination, and the Effect of a Colorblind Policy on the Crime Rate, 9 J.
PUB. ECON. THEORY 521 (2007).
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to higher victimization risks.46 Moreover, Risse and Zeckhauser discount
nonwelfarist harms from involuntary police contacts.47 Compared to higher risks
of victimization, they claim that the dignity or privacy harms of racial selectivity
are small, net of the punishment and liberty costs to the guilty, and that such
nonwelfarist consequences of excess police contact pale next to greater harms such
as housing or employment discrimination.48
A more careful specification of the dignity incursions in a regime of racial
profiling, given the inherently high error rate, challenges this relativist notion that
other harms are worse. Bennett Capers suggests that the widespread use of
coercive police authority to conduct high discretion and intrusive stops, or
field interrogations, produces several incursions on dignity49 that can produce
legal estrangement50 if not psychological trauma.51 Reginald Williams also
unpacks the logic of profiling by noting that simply stopping persons based on a
profile, whether that profile is accurate, produces intolerable error rates by
failing to more accurately specify what it is about those persons that makes them
statistically more likely to engage in crime.52
B.

Resolving Normative Tensions with Empirical Claims of Police Bias

In this Article, we assess whether these second order signals that crime is
afoot, the indicia of suspicion that animate stops, meet Professors Williams’s
46.

47.

48.

49.
50.
51.
52.

Dominitz, supra note 45. See Steven N. Durlauf, Racial Profiling as a Public Policy Question:
Efficiency, Equity, and Ambiguity, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (2005) for a critique. Id. at
133("[F]airness requires that individuals not be held responsible for things outside their
control but may be held responsible for factors for which one holds an individual responsible.
In the profiling context, this leads to the idea that fairness requires equal treatment of the
innocent with respect to race.").
Risse & Seckhauser, supra note 22, at 150 & n.24 ("We believe that the harms of racism and
profiling may be subadditive, just as the harms of different forms of racism may be. In a world
where [B]lacks are discriminated against in schooling and jobs, are they made much better off
if only one of the forms of discrimination is removed?").
See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Elliott Ash, New Policing, New Segregation: From Ferguson to New
York, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 33 (2017) (showing that proactive policing has contributed to racial
residential segregation by burdening nonwhite populations with criminal histories and a racial
tax of financial penalties for minor offenses).
I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 68–69 (2009)
(stating a similar claim in terms of “public shaming”).
Bell, supra note 4, at 13. See also Capers, supra note 49.
Amanda Geller, Jeffrey Fagan, Tom Tyler & Bruce G. Link, Aggressive Policing and the Mental
Health of Young Urban Men, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321 (2014). See also Capers, supra note
49.
Reginald Williams, Risse and Zeckhauser on Racial Profiling: A Reply, 22 UTILITAS 228 (2010).
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challenge on the accuracy of those signals. In fact, the evidence in this Article
shows they do not, and in turn produces social and legal harms in the form of street
detentions that risk both losses of liberty and risks of physical injury.
We exploit data on these stops to interrogate the Floyd court’s claim. We
conduct five tests to assess whether racial discrimination infects SQF stops: the
allocation of officers relative to crime and population in specific areas, the decision
to sanction conditional on a stop, the decision to arrest or issue a summons
conditional on the decision to sanction, the efficiency of stops in seizing
contraband including weapons, and updating processes by officers in their search
activity. In each test, we include the indicia of suspicion that officers indicated as
the basis of each stop. For most of the estimates, we include benchmarks of crime
and race to control for conditions that can influence police perceptions and
decision making.53 We find consistent evidence of bias toward Blacks,
Hispanics, and Black Hispanics, and significant differences by race in the use of
the parameters of reasonable suspicion that motivate stops.

I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Race and Selective Enforcement

The early literature on racially selective enforcement focused primarily on
the search for drugs and other contraband in stops of motorists.54 Typically,
motorist studies test for bias by first examining the probability of a search
conditional on a stop.55 A second inquiry in these studies is the benefit of profiling
by examining the yields, or hit rates, from highway stops and searches. If stops and
searches of minority motorists yield higher rates of seizures, drugs, or other
contraband, any bias is discounted due to their unequal propensity for crime. In
that case, searches are interpreted as a means of efficient crime control. Never
mind that these assumptions of efficiency are rooted in racially skewed ex-post

53.
54.

55.

See Adam M. Samaha, supra note 18, at 1620–34; see also Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note
18, at 330–34.
See, e.g., Nicola Persico, Racial Profiling, Fairness, and Effectiveness of Policing, 92 AM. ECON.
REV. 1472 (2002) (showing that police behavior is fair if all racial and ethnic groups are groups
are policed with the same intensity but that may be inefficient if their propensities for crime
differ.) See Gross & Livingston, supra note 41. See generally Harcourt, supra note 41.
Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on
the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651 (2002).
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probabilities of drug possession on the highway.56 Still, for advocates of hit rate
tests, equal hit rates across races are consistent with no bias.
In most of the highway studies, the first stage decision about who to stop is
unobserved and not incorporated in analyses of subsequent actions during and
after the stop. So, if race influences the selection of motorists for stops and the
decision about which motorists to search once stopped, estimates of racial bias in
searches and yields may be low. For example, Katherine Barnes showed that
including an approximation of this first stage selection function in her analysis of
searches in highway stops significantly reshaped both the estimates of disparate
treatment of motorists and the productivity of stops.57
A similar test focuses on both officer search costs and driver risks of
detection. John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and Petra Todd (collectively known as
KPT) used a disparate treatment model to test whether highway searches reflect
racial discrimination or are consistent with an efficiency model.58 The KPT model
has been replicated in several other studies of racial bias in highway stops.59 It
suggests that in the absence of racial discrimination, the proportion of searches
yielding drugs (or hit rate) will be equated across races. This approach skirts the
question of whether police intend to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or race
and instead focuses on disparate impacts of police stop strategies. They refer to this
as an equilibrium model, in which officers will adjust their search strategies based
on their success rates and would-be criminal offenders will adjust their
propensities for law violations according to their perceived risk of detection and
punishment.60 Searches that disproportionately target one racial group with a
relatively low hit rate are inefficient.
Furthermore, maintaining an imbalance of police searches in the face of
disproportionate hit rates across races suggests racial bias. An officer who is not
biased and who is seeking to maximize her hit rate would reduce the number of

56.
57.

58.
59.
60.

Risse & Zeckhauser, supra note 2.
“If, for example, [B]lack motorists chose to carry drugs more often than whites, the police
would respond by increasing their level of policing [B]lacks, and [B]lack motorists would
respond to the increase by lowering their frequency of carrying drugs. In essence, the model
predicts that any criminal profile is useless in increasing the hit rate of searches.” Katherine Y.
Barnes, Assessing the Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction Absent Racial Profiling,
54 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1101 (2005). See also Harcourt, supra note 41 (showing that the assumption
of race-invariant elasticities is theoretically ungrounded, empirically unverifiable, and likely
inaccurate in a population based model).
John Knowles, Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and
Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203 (2001).
See, e.g., Durlauf, supra note 4.
See Knowles, Persico and Todd, supra note 58.
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unproductive stops toward the group with the lowest hit rate. That is, police may
improve their overall hit rate by shifting resources away from that group. An
unbiased policing regime would generate no differences in hits between different
groups, suggesting a taste for justice or safety.
The KPT approach requires no controls for other potential explanatory
variables.61 The model suggests that an aggregate difference in hit rates for Blacks
and whites determines whether racial animus is present. This is also a
disadvantage, however, because it translates into unrealistic predictions.
Specifically, the model implies that all groups of individuals, regardless of other
characteristics, are equally likely to carry drugs on the highway.62 The problem is
that the equilibrium model depends on the assumption that all racial and ethnic
groups have the same elasticity of offending to increased policing pressure. That
is, a minority group must be responsive to profiling and must actually be deterred
by the more frequent stops and searches into offending less often—or at least, they
must be as deterred as are whites.63 Moreover, and perhaps most important in a
legal context, the model is agnostic to the question of whether police target one
racial group for stops, which poses questions relevant to both Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The model suffers from a contradiction in the way that decision making is
structured by the presumed feedback loops of differential rates of carrying
contraband – in this case, weapons and especially firearms – and their responses to
the risks of detection. The model presumes that an unbiased officer would actually
have to know the group with the lowest hit rates and their propensity for carrying
contraband in order to decide on whom to focus her attention. Without this
knowledge, maximizing her hit rate by reducing the number of unproductive

61.

62.
63.

Id. But see Sarath Sanga, Comment, Reconsidering Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches:
Theory and Evidence, 117 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (2009) (reestimating the KPT study in Maryland
to find bias in searches toward Black and Hispanic drivers after adding stop location
information and considering the totality of searches across all highways by the state police).
Barnes, supra note 57 at 1100, n.36. Harcourt, supra note 41, at 1354 (critiquing the
assumption that racial profiling is rational, as well as which population should be profiled,
using a series of hypothetical elasticities and offending rate parameters).
See, e.g., Ariela Gross, History, Race, and Prediction: Comments on Harcourt’s Against
Prediction, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 235, 239 (2008) (“If African American and Latin[x] drivers
who carry drugs, for example, have less elasticity of offending to policing—if, because of their
lower socio-economic status, they have fewer choices for noncriminal economic activity and
continue to carry drugs despite the disproportionate risk of being stopped and searched—then
although the police may maximize their hit rate, they could actually increase overall crime in
society. If whites who carry drugs while driving have higher elasticity of offending, and
recognize that they are unlikely to be stopped, they will commit more drug crimes.”).
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stops seems either random or guesswork.64 Perhaps this failure of the KPT model
explains the extremely low hit rates cited by the Floyd court in characterizing the
SQF regime as indirect profiling.
B.

Selective Enforcement in Pedestrian Stops

The Terry doctrine supports a regulatory model for the Fourth
Amendment in the context of searches for weapons or other contraband, a
model that might support officer updating and learning. There is no empirical
evidence, however, that officers’ greater exposure and deeper experience lead to
either less discrimination or greater accuracy.65 In other words, more experience
may not mean fewer hunches as the Terry Court supposed.
In part, this reflects the capacious standards articulated by the Terry Court.
The Terry Court emphasized that reasonable suspicion must not be based on an
officer’s “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but [on] the specific
and reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience.”66 The hit rate model and its later extensions were developed based on
searches and seizures in vehicle stops. With few exceptions, its application to
street stops has been quite limited.67 In fact, pedestrian stops and vehicle stops are
distinct in important ways, and the equilibrium model requires some tailoring to
fit the street context. The regulation of street stops is largely constitutional based
on both standards and subjective perceptions to apply those standards,68 whereas

64.
65.

66.
67.

68.

Thanks to Professor Seth Stoughton for developing this critique. Personal Communication with
Seth Stoughton, (July 15, 2021) (on file with author).
See Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back Into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 930
(2009). Minzner, following the careers of individual officers, found that success rates for
probable cause searches was consistent over time, where successful and unsuccessful officers
continued on those same tracks.
Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097
(1998). Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
Fagan Report, supra note 14; Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the
New York City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial
Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813 (2007); Decio Coviello & Nicola Persico, An Economic Analysis
of Black-White Disparities in the New York Police Department’s Stop-and-Frisk Program, 44 J.
LEGAL STUD. 315 (2015).
For example, in Illinois v. Wardlow, a suspect’s presence in a “high crime area” was validated
as a multiplier of less salient factors into actionable suspicion or facially subjective rationales
such as furtive movements or other criminal appearances. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
124 (2000). Yet, neither the Wardlow majority nor any subsequent cases attempted to
standardize the parameters of a “high crime area,” completing the subjectivization of what
Terry had launched three decades earlier. Id. See also Fagan, supra note 23, at 62.
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vehicle code rules provide the structure of regulatory control for vehicle stops.
For example, the bases of suspicion in vehicle stops, whether pretextual not, are
considerably narrower and constrained by law.69 In vehicle stops, the bases of
suspicion for the initial encounter are proscribed by local vehicle and traffic
codes, a seemingly more objective standard. Pedestrian stops usually are based
on vague and subjective perceptions of suspicious behavior and are regulated by
a reasonableness standard whose application gives great deference to the judgment
and perceptions of the police officer to apply subjective and vaguely defined
behavioral parameters.70
Thus, the set of pedestrians who are stopped and subject to search may well
be defined by different processes and standards. In part, the differences in these
pools reflect how police resources are deployed, with more police allocated to
places with higher crime rates but also higher proportions of Black and Latinx
residents.71 Other features of pedestrian stops also suggest that a basic equilibrium
model may not capture the totality of factors that shape police decisions to search
and possibly arrest a suspect. Namely, a basic equilibrium model cannot account
for the type of stop outcome (as in the type of seizure or the type of sanction), local
crime, or social conditions.

69.

70.
71.

This is not to say that vehicle stops cannot be pretextual given the breadth of motor vehicle
codes and the doctrine regulating such stops. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
817, 819 (1996) (holding that any traffic offense committed by a driver was a legitimate legal
basis for a stop even if the actual reason for the stop was based on the driver’s race). The Whren
Court went out of its way to state that the holding was race-neutral so long as probable cause
could be demonstrated. Id. See also Rohit Asirvatham & Michael Frakes, Are Constitutional
Rights Enough? An Empirical Assessment of Racial Bias in Police Stops (Duke L. Sch. Pub. L. &
Legal Theory Series No. 2020-56, 2020); see also Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp, Kelsey
Shoub & Bayard Love, Targeting Young Men of Color for Search and Arrest During Traffic
Stops: Evidence from North Carolina, 2002–2013, 5 POL., GRPS., & IDENTITIES, 107, 108 (2017)
(“The Whren decision opened the floodgates to pretextual stops. Thus, tens of thousands of
[B]lack and [B]rown drivers have routinely been stopped and searched in an effort to reduce
drug use.”); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional:
Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
882, 941 (2015) (“Whren . . . . endorsed racial discrimination, and thereby encouraged its
spread.”).
William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1213 (1998); Jeffrey Fagan &
Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51 (2015).
We might expect a rational allocation of police activity and resources to match variation in
local crime rates. But in the setting of this research, we also observe a marginal effect of racial
composition by neighborhoods beyond the local crime rate, leading to statistical
discrimination in those areas. See Jeffrey Fagan, Response to Ridgeway: Allocating Police, 36 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 703 (2017).
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Hit has been narrowly defined as a seizure of contraband, mainly drugs or
weapons seizures. But several other types of outcomes, each relevant both to
the economic assumptions of the model and to the underlying policy goals, are
relevant. For example, police in New York City and Los Angeles make pedestrian
stops in search of weapons, stolen goods, or persons with outstanding warrants.72
It is not unreasonable to expect heterogeneity by type of seizure (guns versus
drugs versus absconders), and in turn, varying estimates of bias in the conduct of
stops.73
In theory, the local crime and social conditions where stops take place are not
incorporated into either the first stage selection of individuals for stops nor later
decisions to search or arrest within the stop. The omission of neighborhood
context in equilibrium models also biases estimates of the proportionality of police
stops of citizens. Context includes not just the racial composition of an area, but
also housing, economic activity, and generally, social class, structural, and social
factors that can increase the perceptions of suspicion as well as police decisions to
stop, search, or arrest.74
The randomizing equilibrium assumptions in the KPT approach—that both
police and potential offenders adjust their behavior in response to the joint
probabilities of carrying contraband and being stopped—tend to average across
broad heterogeneous conditions both in police decision making and offenders’
propensities to commit a crime.75 This tendency toward subjective averaging of
suspicion discounts the effects of officers’ race-specific sensitivities toward

72.
73.

74.
75.

Jeffrey Fagan & John MacDonald, Policing, Crime, and Legitimacy in New York and Los
Angeles: The Social and Political Contexts of Two Historic Crime Declines, in NEW YORK AND
LOS ANGELES: THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE (David Halle & Andrew A. Beveridge eds., 2013).
See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Anthony A. Braga, Rod K. Brunson & April Pattavina, Stops and
Stares: Street Stops, Surveillance, and Race in the New Policing, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 539
(2016); Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Profiling and Consent: Stops, Searches, and Seizures
after Soto, 27 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 16 (2020); Sarath Sanga, Does Officer Race Matter?, 16
AM. L. ECON. REV. 403 (2014) (showing that officer race does not influence hit rates by suspect
race controlling for neighborhood characteristics but it does suggest that officers show
discriminatory in-group favoritism in making Terry stops); see also Billy R. Close & Patrick L.
Mason, Searching for Efficient Enforcement: Officer Characteristics and Racially Biased Policing,
3 REV. L. & ECON. 263 (2007); Kate Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial
Profiling: Evidence From the Boston Police Department, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 163 (2009);
Bjerk, supra note 45.
David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Arrest, 45
DEMOGRAPHY 55 (2008); Douglas A. Smith, The Neighborhood Context of Police Behavior, 8
CRIME & JUST. 313 (1986).
Durlauf, supra note 4; Dhammika Dharmapala & Stephen L. Ross, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle
Searches: Additional Theory and Evidence, 3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. POL’Y & ANALYSIS, 1
(2004).
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suspects’ crime decisions.76 Police perceptions of suspicion are often shaped by the
physical, social, and crime conditions of the area where the police-citizen
encounter takes place. In other words, the cognitive processes leading to the
formation of suspicion may vary both by area—where areas are defined in part by
their racial composition—and by race of the individual who falls under the police
gaze.77 Both physical and social disorders invite a stronger police presence and
more active police activity in the form of stops and arrests, likely leading to lower
hit rates in that area.78 Police decisions to arrest or use their discretion for informal
actions following an encounter also are likely shaped by the environment.79
The acts of persons observed are far more heterogeneous in pedestrian stops.
Pedestrian stops result from observation of social behaviors, and even group
behaviors, in a broader range of social contexts. Drivers may interact with other
passengers or maneuver their car in a certain way, but rarely are engaged with
neighbors or even strangers in the sustained and continuous way that occurs in
street behaviors. Therefore, signals of suspicious behavior on the street may be
far different than the narrow and codified realm of driving behavior or vehicle
conditions. These differences may produce not just compositional contrasts but
also contrasts in the behaviors that evoke a police response. This heterogeneity
may also be an important driver of hit rates.

76.
77.

78.

79.

Jeff Dominitz & John Knowles, Crime Minimisation and Racial Bias: What Can We Learn
From Police Search Data?, 116 ECON. J. F368 (2006).
See, e.g., Samaha, supra note 18; Robert J. Sampson, When Things Aren’t What They Seem:
Context and Cognition in Appearance-Based Regulation, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 97 (2012);
Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 18; Geoffrey P. Alpert, John M. MacDonald & Roger G.
Dunham, Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43
CRIMINOLOGY 407 (2005).
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 74; Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows:
Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (2000); William Terrill
& Michael D. Reisig, Neighborhood Context and Police Use of Force, 40 J. RSCH. CRIME &
DELINQ. 291 (2003); Joscha Legewie, Racial Profiling and Use of Force in Police Stops: How Local
Events Trigger Periods of Increased Discrimination, 122 AM. J. SOCIO. 379, 385 (2016)
(“[N]eighborhoods are a critical situational factor that influences all forms of police behavior
including racial bias and misconduct.”); Ayobami Laniyonu, Coffee Shops and Street Stops:
Policing Practices in Gentrifying Neighborhoods, 54 URB. AFFS. REV. 898 (2018).
See Kirk, supra note 74; David S. Kirk & Mauri Matsuda, Legal Cynicism, Collective Efficacy,
and the Ecology of Arrest, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 443 (2011); Charles C. Lanfear, Lindsey R. Beach &
Timothy A. Thomas, Formal Social Control in Changing Neighborhoods: Racial Implications of
Neighborhood Context on Reactive Policing, 17 CITY & CMTY. 1075 (2018); Ben Grunwald &
Jeffrey Fagan, The End of Intuition-Based High-Crime Areas, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 345, 350–51
(2019) (showing that police in New York indicate crime location or high crime area as a basis
of suspicion in over 50 percent of all stops but that they report nearly every area as high crime
regardless of its actual crime rate). The suspect’s race and the racial composition of the stop
location predicts the use of crime location as a basis of suspicion. Grunwald & Fagan, supra.

1604

68 UCLA L. R EV. 1584 (2022)

These differences suggest a need for several extensions and modifications to an
equilibrium model to accommodate the unique circumstances of pedestrian
stops. Primarily, extensions to the equilibrium model follow from the Terry
constitutional regime. For example, understanding bias in this context is less a
matter of efficiency, because efficiency is immaterial to the legality of these policecitizen interactions. That legality is instead shaped by the boundaries of how
officers understand and apply the standards of reasonable and individualized
suspicion that are at the heart of Terry and successive cases applying the Fourth
Amendment. The broad discretion under reasonable suspicion, both its vague
substantiative standards and the deference to the experience of the average officer,
creates a space of uncertain but likely influential constitutional rules.80
But it should not be surprising that there is no agreement on the boundaries
of an acceptable or efficient hit rate. The question of a baseline hit rate for all stops
is a separate matter from the statistical differences that could signal race-neutrality.
The former is a matter of efficiency and accuracy, while the latter addresses the
question of whether the safety benefits and burdens are equitably shared across
racial and ethnic groups.81 Only recently have researchers addressed the threshold
question that combines both the amount and type of suspicion into a single

80.

81.

The Terry Court and subsequent courts have recognized the role experience and training play
in officers determining reasonable suspicion: “[The totality of the circumstances review]
process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that
‘might well elude an untrained person.’” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)); see also United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (“We have held that probable cause means ‘a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,’ and the level of suspicion required for a Terry
stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.”) (citation omitted) (quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Courts have deferred to an officer’s seventeen years
of experience. See United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 361 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[The officer’s]
suspicion is entitled to significant weight, because he had been a law enforcement officer for
seventeen years.”), opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010). Others
defer to an officers’ past experience in similar situations. See, e.g., United States v. Timms, No.
17-CR-130 (KBF), 2017 WL 3503373, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2017) (noting as evidence of
reasonable suspicion that the officers “had both experienced situations involving multiple
firearms in the past.”).
There is no agreement on what constitutes an acceptable hit rate that satisfies the
reasonableness standard based on the observed hit rate, nor have courts addressed this
question. In Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting), for
example, Justice Scalia suggested that at least 5, if not 10 percent, of the entire universe of
incidents would need to be an accurate hit to be indicative of reasonable suspicion. Id. at 410.
According to Scalia, absent such a showing, the basis of suspicion is not reasonable. Id.
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threshold measure of suspicion, permitting more robust tests of the presence of
racial discrimination in street and vehicle stops.82
Accordingly, understanding bias in pedestrian stops, whether in an
equilibrium model or some other specification, requires that we account for
constitutional rules. To do this, factors that may permissibly activate suspicion
must be integrated into the analyses. For example, experimental research suggests
that hot cognitions—cognitions made under conditions of arousal—may activate
unconscious biases83 and interact with other cognitive mechanisms to produce
disparate perceptions and outcomes by race.84 Those factors could be observable,
pretextual, or simply the product of racial stereotyping of civilians’ behaviors.
The worry in this regime is about race: unconscious patterns that shape the
formation of suspicion based on archetypes such as the “symbolic assailant.”85
Subjective views of appearances or behaviors may substitute for objective
indicia of suspicion, but the demands of constitutional regulation require that
those be articulated explicitly and within discernable boundaries. These factors

82.

83.

84.

85.

See Camelia Simoiu, Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Problem of Infra-Marginality in
Outcome Tests for Discrimination, 11 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 1193 (2017); See also Sharad Goel,
Justin M. Rao & Ravi Shroff, Precinct or Prejudice? Understanding Racial Disparities in New
York City’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 10 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 365 (2016).
See, e.g., Weston J. Morrow & John A. Shjarback, Police Worldviews, Unconscious Bias, and
Their Potential to Contribute to Racial and Ethnic Disparities in New York Police Department
(NYPD) Stops for Reason of “Furtive Movement,” 17 J. ETHNICITY CRIM. JUST. 269 (2019).
(focusing on self-reports by officers of their world views as indicia of biases about the behaviors
of persons of different racial or ethnic groups).
See Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G. Davies, Seeing Black:
Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 876 (2004); Catherine A.
Cottrell & Steven L. Neuberg, Different Emotional Reactions to Different Groups: A
Sociofunctional Threat-Based Approach to “Prejudice,” 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 770
(2005); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About
Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483 (2004); Danielle Currin, Hot and Cold
Cognition,
PSYCH.
ACTION
(Mar.
10,
2020),
https://www.
psychologyinaction.org/psychology-in-action-1/hot-and-cold-cognition
[https://
perma.cc/T72F-2QNK] (distinguishing cold cognitions, or those based on logic and reason
and objective fact, from hot cognitions that involve social or emotional evaluations, reward,
pleasure or disgust, or risk taking).
JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 45–46 (4th ed. 2011) (“Police officers, because
their work requires them to be occupied continually with potential violence, develop a
perceptual shorthand to identify certain kinds of people as symbolic assailants . . . who use
gesture, language and attire that the police have come to recognize as a prelude to violence.”);
Jeannine Bell, Dead Canaries in the Coal Mines: The Symbolic Assailant Revisited, 34 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 513 (2018); Morrow & Shjarback, supra note 83 at 73.
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likely vary by subject race or ethnicity, and in turn likely lead to differences in hit
rates.86
The essence of the Floyd court’s conclusions is that officers engaged in
“indirect profiling” coded in terms of stop rationale.87 The bias components of
these questions in turn lead us to include the interactions of these suspicion
factors with race, to assess how race-specific interpretations and evaluations of
behavior shape bias in pedestrian stops.88 Given the complex task environment
of policing and the intense culture of the policing workplace and its information
networks,89 the design of debiasing mechanisms that disconnect race from
either danger or criminality is a considerable institutional and constitutional
challenge.
C.

Is It Bias?

Whether in investigative stops or use of force, researchers trying to identify
the role of race or gender typically estimate differences between groups after
adjusting for race correlated factors. This is generally thought of as a benchmark
strategy, and some analysts are perhaps too generous in extending the results to a
causal claim of the effect of race on outcomes.90
Johann Gaebler and colleagues point out the flaws in this approach: (1) race
(and gender) are both immutable traits but also complex and heterogenous
constructs that are beyond experimental manipulation; (2) race and gender carry

86.

87.
88.

89.

90.

Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance
Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 777, 802 (1999) (discussing the U.S. Supreme
Court's recognition of the potential for bias and abuse of the law in vague criteria that define
inchoate crimes).
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
In other words, we try to go beyond a test for good or efficient bias, which is rational and loaded
with assumptions about base rates and elasticities, and the bad kind, which is based solely on
racial animus. We go beyond this test by estimating the extent to which the bad kind infects
decisions about who to stop and how to treat those persons afterward. See infra Part III
(discussing the results of our regression analysis).
See, e.g., George Wood, Daria Roithmayr & Andrew V. Papachristos, The Network Structure
of Police Misconduct, 5 SOCIUS 1 (2019); Justin E. Holz, Roman G. Rivera & Bocar A. Ba,
Spillover Effects in Police Use of Force (U. Pa., Inst. for L. & Econ. Rsch., Paper No. 20-03,
2019); Susan Mizner, Police ‘Command and Control’ Culture Is Often Lethal—Especially for
People With Disabilities, ACLU (May 10, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://
www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/reforming-police/police-command-andcontrol-culture-often-lethal-especially [https://perma.cc/L4F6-JWUE].
Roland Neil & Christopher Winship, Methodological Challenges and Opportunities in Testing
for Racial Discrimination in Policing, 2 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 73 (2019).
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the weight of a wide array of covariates and confounders, and any estimates of
race effects are averages across those categories, and (3) estimates of bias are
confounded with the selection of individuals for the treatment by police, especially
if that selection is based on the same discrimination processes that are instantiated
in the outcome measure.91 This is a particularly difficult problem in studies that
rely on police records, in which individuals may be selected based on attributes
that condition the outcome of their interactions.92 At the heart of the controversy
over these selection issues are whether the assumptions of bias in the supply of
cases are ignorable and can be considered either as noise or a problem of omitted
variables, even when there is unmeasured bias or confounders in the initial
selection of subjects for treatment.93
For example, in selective enforcement by police, disparate impacts may
result from imbalances in the allocations of officers to particular
neighborhoods.94 How police are allocated to neighborhoods determines their
exposure to civilians and the likelihood of police contact and ensuing interactions.
Persons living or moving through areas with higher police presence are at greater
risk for stops, temporary detentions, frisks, or searches. Disparities in stop rates can
also be the product of racially selective enforcement by officers, even after
accounting for allocations of police officers to specific neighborhoods or areas.
Disparities can also arise when a pattern of racially selective enforcement endures
over time despite internal information about its unequal application or its
efficiency.
The stakes in this debate extend both to liberty issues in stops and arrests and
injury or mortality in the case of fatal police encounters. Whether police practices
are biased is at the core of the doctrinal debate, as well as the politics of policing
and crime. Detecting bias in racial profiling or police shootings is a contentious
matter, and its extent remains unsettled empirically.95 Error rates may run both

91.
92.
93.
94.

95.

Johann Gaebler, William Cai, Guillaume Basse, Ravi Shroff, Sharad Goel & Jennifer Hill,
Deconstructing Claims of Post-Treatment Bias in Observational Studies of Discrimination,
ARXIV PREPRINT ARXIV:2006.12460 (2020).
Steven N. Durlauf & James J. Heckman, An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police
Use of Force: A Comment, 128 J. POL. ECON. 3998 (2020).
Dean Knox, Will Lowe & Jonathan Mummolo, Administrative Records Mask Racially Biased
Policing, 114 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 619 (2020).
Fagan, supra note 71, at 704; Andrew P. Wheeler, Allocating Police Resources While Limiting
Racial Inequality, 37 JUST. Q. 842 (2020); Federico Liberatore, Miguel Camacho-Collados &
Lara Quijano-Sánchez, Equity in the Police Districting Problem: Balancing Territorial and
Racial Fairness in Patrolling Operations, J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY (2021).
See, e.g., Gaebler, Cai, Basse, Shroff, Goel & Hill, supra note 91; Bocar A. Ba, Dean Knox,
Jonathan Mummolo & Roman Rivera, The Role of Officer Race and Gender in Police-Civilian
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ways, largely because of the assumptions about police behavior that is implausible
and inaccurate yet cannot be ignored.96
Consider the example of police shootings of Black and Hispanic civilians and
the controversy over whether these shootings reflect racial bias. Roland Fryer
coded the details of police shootings in Harris County (Houston), Texas, and
concluded that there was no empirical evidence of bias.97 Fryer assessed racial
disparities in fatal police shootings, employing a variety of controls specific to the
incident. Fryer was blind to police contacts that did not result in shootings or
shootings that did not lead to fatalities. Fryer concluded that there was no bias
only if those conditions, both in the incident itself and in the selection of
individuals for the fatal encounter, can be ignored. Dean Knox and colleagues
responded, arguing that real world conditions, statistically and in the social
realities of how one might ignore selection, are implausible and lead to flawed
estimates.98 Others showed through a combination of statistical proofs and
counterfactuals99 that the ignorability assumption could produce results that not
only are biased but that “erase . . . stark (and undisputed) disparities” in an
“immense historical record.”100 In simpler terms, the claim of race-neutral police
decisions to fatally shoot suspects is blind to the possibility that these results may
not be replicable under other sampling and measurement conditions.101
Distinguishing tastes and preferences for crime control versus
discrimination are but one simple example of the tensions in testing for bias in
policing. Estimating race-specific base rates—both objectively and in the
assumptions of the police officer—pose a second problem, that of

Interactions in Chicago, 371 SCI. 696 (2021); John M. MacDonald & Jeffrey Fagan, Using Shifts
in Deployment and Operations to Test for Racial Bias in Police Stops, 109 AM. ECON. ASS’N.
PAPERS & PROC, 148 (2019); Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in
Police Use of Force, 127 J. POL. ECON. 1210 (2019); Close & Mason, supra note 73; Nicola Persico
& Petra E. Todd, Passenger Profiling, Imperfect Screening, and Airport Security, 95 AM. ECON.
ASS’N PAPERS & PROC. 127 (2005); Antonovics & Knight, supra note 73; John J. Donohue III &
Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Race on Policing and Arrests, 44 J.L. & ECON. 367 (2001).
96. See Ba, Knox, Mummolo & Rivera, supra note 95; Neil & Winship, supra note 90; Ian Ayres,
Outcome Tests of Racial Disparities in Police Practices, 4 JUST. RSCH. & POL’Y 131 (2002); see also
Durlauf, supra note 4.
97. Fryer, supra note 95.
98. Ba, Knox, Mummolo & Rivera, supra note 95.
99. Durlauf & Heckman, supra note 92.
100. Lily Hu, Race, Policing, and the Limits of Social Science, BOS. REV. (May 6, 2021), http://
bostonreview.net/science-nature-race/lily-hu-race-policing-and-limits-social-science
[https://perma.cc/S63A-SXZ3].
101. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and Reasonableness in Police Killings, 100
B.U. L. REV. 951 (2020).
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“benchmarking” or indexing police actions to the expected base rate of
crime.102 The choice of which crime benchmark, as well as which exposure
measures such as population or area, itself is controversial.103 Measurement
error and assumptions both about crime and what matters in police
perceptions are unresolved tensions in the choice of benchmark options.
D.

Research Setting: The Stop and Frisk Program in New York and the
Floyd Findings

We use this framework to test for racial discrimination in pedestrian stops
with data from the contentious SQF program of the NYPD. New York is an
important context to address this question. Its SQF regime produced over 5
million citizen stops between 2004 and 2013. The stops are regulated by both Terry
(federal) constitutional standards and DeBour (New York) caselaw regarding
reasonable suspicion.104 Stops in this era are well-documented, including a
structured format for reporting the indicia of reasonable suspicion that motivated
the stop.105 Recent court opinions on the NYPD stop and frisk program found
both Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations.106

102. Greg Ridgeway & John MacDonald, Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing, in RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 180 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010).
103. Jeffrey Fagan, Law, Social Science, and Racial Profiling, 4 JUST. RSCH. & POL’Y 103 (2002); Ian
Ayres, supra note 96; see also Lawrence Rosenthal, The Crime Drop and the Fourth
Amendment: Toward an Empirical Jurisprudence of Search and Seizure, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 641 (2005).
104. Both People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976) and People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204
(N.Y. 1992) require articulable and individualized suspicion for a stop. De Bour identifies four
levels of police conduct once suspicion is formed and an officer decides to effect a detention.
(1) Credible suspicion. A police officer who has an objective credible reason to approach
someone may request information. (2) Founded suspicion. If a police officer has a founded
suspicion, he may engage that person in the common law right of inquiry. (3) Reasonable
suspicion. A police officer who has a reasonable suspicion regarding an individual may
forcibly stop that person. Additionally, if the police officer fears that the person may have
weapons, the police officer may frisk the person for weapons. (4) Probable cause. If a police
officer has probable cause, he may arrest and search such. See NYPD PATROL GUIDE,
PROCEDURE 212-11: INVESTIGATIVE ENCOUNTERS: REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION, COMMON LAW
RIGHT
OF
INQUIRY,
AND
LEVEL
3
STOPS,
https://www1.nyc.gov/
site/ccrb/investigations/nypd-patrol-guide.page
[https://perma.cc/XF7T-Q39R]
(showing the rules and procedures that officers must follow in conducting and
documenting investigative stops).
105. Fagan & Geller, supra note 70, at 56–61.
106. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ligon v. City of New York, 959
F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2013); Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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The stops are motivated in theory by constitutional standards of reasonable
suspicion and are applied broadly in pedestrian contexts in both residential and
commercial areas,107 inside public housing,108 inside other subsidized housing, and
on public transportation.109 Stops are spread across areas that vary along social and
economic conditions that capture the covariates of crime and also of policing,
including, for example, commercial areas of low crime and low population but
high stop rates.
Perhaps most important, the SQF regime has been the subject of
contentious litigation through multiple cases spanning more than a decade. In
the district court’s opinion finding evidence of violations on both constitutional
claims, the court undertook a novel analysis linking reasonable suspicion and the
outcomes—efficiency or hit rates—of stops to questions of racial bias. The
foundation of the court’s opinion—indirect profiling based on the disparate and
inaccurate application of reasonable suspicion—invites an analysis for racial
disparities and biases. Such an analysis incorporates extensions of an
equilibrium model by using the indicia of suspicion. We exploit these data and
that invitation to examine the validity of the Floyd court’s conclusions on race and
indirect racial profiling.

II.
A.

DATA AND METHODS

Study Design

We use the term “bias” to express what more specifically is
conceptualized as disparate treatment or a taste for discrimination.110
Discrimination can take several forms, but we concentrate on two forms: systemic

107. Fagan Report, supra note 14.
108. Adam Carlis, The Illegality of Vertical Patrols, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 2002 (2009). Jeffrey Fagan,
Garth Davies & Adam Carlis, Race and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing, 9 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 697 (2012).
109. Opinion & Order, Ligon v. City of New York, 12 Civ. 2274 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
110. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 13, 15, 20–21 (1957) (proposing a
model of a "taste for discrimination" where whites prefer to invest capital in white labor
instead of nonwhite labor to offset the perceived costs of working with Black and other
nonwhite labor. If whites have a taste for discrimination, even when blinded to the returns of
alternate labor investments, they will impose a regime where they believe the marginal returns
are greater than would be the case of investments in diverse labor markets).
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disparate treatment (at the neighborhood level) and individual disparate
treatment (at the stop level).111
The first analysis tests for racial disparities in the allocation of officers to
police precincts or neighborhoods. An unbiased policing regime would allocate
officers to neighborhoods primarily on the basis of serious crime rates, assuming
that the primary objective of policing allocation decisions is to control crime and
protect public safety. This is a distributional principle that affords civilians equal
protection from crime and equitably distributes civilian exposure to police across
neighborhoods according to their crime risks.112 Controlling for crime risk, if
police executives allocate more officers to precincts with greater concentrations
of populations that have certain characteristics, that would suggest a systemic
disparate treatment on the basis of those characteristics. Racial composition of
the precinct is the primary characteristic we consider, given its centrality in
normative and legal debates on bias in criminal justice. We assume that there is a
systemic disparate treatment based on race when we observe police
allocations of officers to precincts that have higher concentrations of
minority populations after controlling for the crime component of the allocation
decision. Disparities in allocations increase the exposure of people to police in
those areas, in turn increasing the likelihood of a police-civilian encounter and the
risk of an unconstitutional stop.
The second form of discrimination of interest is individual disparate
treatment. We test this in two ways. First, we examine the behavior of officers
toward persons in the locales where they have been allocated or assigned by
estimating their stop rates both per capita and per reported crime. Second, we
examine how race affects the outcome of each stop, controlling for the bases of
suspicion in the stop. To do this, we conduct a series of outcome tests to assess and
extend the Floyd court’s conclusions on racial profiling. Outcome tests, including
equilibrium models, are commonly used to test for discrimination113 and have
111. Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 395 (2011) (distinguishing group or systemic discrimination from individual
discrimination and suggesting the importance of each claim).
112. Fagan, supra note 71. The allocation assumptions were articulated at the outset of the stop and
frisk regime in two memoranda and were incorporated into policing strategy by the NYPD
early in 1994, in conjunction with the ascension of the broken windows strategy and the
development of the stop and frisk program. See RUDOLPH GIULIANI &WILLIAM J. BRATTON,
POLICING STRATEGY NO. 1: GETTING GUNS OFF THE STREETS OF NEW YORK (1994) (on file with
author). Soon after, the city published another policy memorandum, focusing on disorder
policing strategies. See RUDOLPH GIULIANI & WILLIAM J. BRATTON, POLICING STRATEGY NO. 5:
RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC SPACES OF NEW YORK (1994) (on file with author).
113. Ayres, supra note 96; Knowles, Persico & Todd, supra note 58.
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been used (and critiqued) to study the NYPD stop and frisk program.114 Simple
outcome tests ignore the likely variability by population groups in their propensity
for the behavior of interest. Even when these differences are benchmarked to the
population share of each group or other group characteristics, the results would be
misleading by ignoring variability within each group in individuals’ propensity for
the targeted behavior.115 In this case, that behavior would include crimes
committed or contraband carried. A simple comparison of hit rates or
population benchmarks would ignore that base rate variability, leading to
misleading results.116 Ian Ayres terms this problem inframarginality.117 Even
when accounting for those base rate differences, the strong assumptions that
would-be violators have perfect knowledge of the search probability and that they
rationally apply that knowledge may be unreasonable for actors with neither
perfect knowledge of risk nor perfect rationality to apply those risks to their
decisions.118 But many of these critiques center on the offender’s behavior and are
agnostic with respect to variation in stop or search preferences by officers.119
In the approach in this study, we assume that officers’ responses to signals of
suspicion are heterogeneous and that the preferences of individual officers and
suspects vary based on those signals that are emitted by civilians and perceived by
officers. Accordingly, we disaggregate stops based on the behavioral and
observational bases of suspicion. This approach allows us to test the effects of racespecific indicia of suspicion as the method of selecting individuals for street stops
and searches. In effect, we are testing a regime of appearance-based selection or
regulation based on race-specific attributions of suspicion.120 The approach

114. Simoiu, Corbett-Davies & Goel, supra note 82; Goel, Rao & Shroff, supra note 82.
115. Greg Ridgeway & John M. MacDonald, Doubly Robust Internal Benchmarking and False
Discovery Rates for Detecting Racial Bias in Police Stops, 104 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 661 (2009).
Ridgeway and MacDonald propose a two-step process in which groups are first benchmarked
based on attributes associated with their status, including population but also other covariates,
and the adjusted group measure is then tested on the outcome variable. Id.
116. Simoiu, Corbett-Davies & Goel, supra note 82, at 1194. See also Neil & Winship, supra note
90.
117. Ayres, supra note 96.
118. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004) (setting conditions for deterrence,
including knowledge of the law, knowledge of risk, and the capacity for rationally applying the
risks to behavioral decisions).
119. See Personal Communication with Seth Stoughton, supra note 6464 (doubting that officers
had knowledge of group propensities for criminal behavior). See also Grunwald & Fagan,
supra note 79 (noting that officers fail to distinguish between actual neighborhood crime rates
and assume all are "high crime areas").
120. See Sampson, supra note 77 and accompanying text; Samaha, supra note 18.
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broadens the range of conditions under which questions of racial bias in
pedestrian stops can be assessed. We take several steps to advance this approach:
1) We first model the allocation of officers to administrative units—
police precincts—within the city.
2) We assume that policing resources are distributed
proportionately with lagged local crime conditions. Any racial
component to allocation metrics would suggest an institutional
preference for greater surveillance of citizens in neighborhoods
according to their racial composition.
3) We conceptualize hit rate as a two-stage conditional process, with the
selection of individuals for stops as the first stage, and the decision to
search as the second stage. We attempt to identify parameters of
discrimination in each of the two stages as discretionary processes.
4) We assess additional components of hits to include seizures of
weapons and contraband.
5) We disaggregate stops and their outcomes according to the
suspected crime that animated the stop and search. Stops are a
heterogeneous set of actions that are freighted with different
parameters of discretion for officers. Low discretion stops for
suspected crimes such as robberies or other violent events may have
different conditional outcomes that reflect officers’ external
priorities and constrain their stop and search decisions, while high
discretion stops for quality of life or other minor offenses may more
closely reflect officers’ tastes and preferences. In contrast to research
on the New York policing regime,121 we expressly model this
heterogeneity.
6) We estimate the effects of the parameters of reasonable suspicion
that officers apply in the decision to stop and search. Specifically,
we incorporate observational data on the constitutionally defined

121. Coviello & Persico, supra note 67.
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reasons for the initial stop and subsequent search to assess the Floyd
court’s conclusions that the components of suspicion vary by race.
7) We include fixed effects for precincts and also cluster standard errors
by precinct to account for local conditions.
8)

We include interactions of race by reasonable suspicion factors to
specify the stereotyping effects of vague criteria of both appearances
and behaviors that are the components of suspicion.

9) We include fixed effects for the year to account for specific events
within any year that may alter stop patterns, such as changes in law
or policy, social or economic conditions, changes in institutional
leaders, or in stop patterns that may have resulted from a specific
court or policy changes. We also model time (in calendar quarters)
to incorporate the changing base rates of stops over the nine year
period from 2004 to 2012.
B.

Data and Variables

1.

Stops

We use de-identified data on stops conducted by the NYPD from 2004 to
2012.122 The NYPD began systematically collecting this data starting in 2003,
following a settlement in Daniels v. City of New York.123 The data were posted on
the NYPD website beginning in 2004. We include data through 2012 when New
122. A police contact is considered a stop when a person is temporarily detained on the street
against his or her will for purposes of questioning. Such a detention is a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). Section 140.50 of
the New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) authorizes a police officer to “stop a person in a
public place . . . when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed
or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 140.50 (McKinney 2021). Once that stop has been made, the CPL authorizes a frisk of the
person only if the officer “reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury.” Id. For
the purposes of this report, the phrase stop, question, and frisk (SQF) does not in each stop
incident, necessarily, imply that a frisk of the person was part of that detention, or that a search
of the suspect’s person or belongings took place.
123. 138 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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York City reduced its stop and frisk activity in the months preceding the start of
the federal civil rights trial.124
Data are available publicly from the New York City OpenData portal.125
Data on the details of each stop are compiled by NYPD officers after the stop.
Officers are required to complete a UF-250 form to record relevant information
on the suspect, including the location of stop by police precinct and specific
location, date and time, stop outcomes (arrest, summons, frisk, search,
contraband, and weapons seizures), race and ethnicity, gender, age, as well as the
suspected crime, the location of the stop, and the factors that aroused reasonable
suspicion leading to the stop (see Appendix A).126 Over 4.7 million stop records
were recorded during the nine year period. We analyze all records with complete
information. We also use block group data aggregated to police precincts from
the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Census to establish estimates for racial and ethnic
population shares to compute local stop rates by race and ethnicity.127
2.

Reasonable Suspicion Factors

Suspicion is recorded by officers who check any of the ten stop factors on the
front of the form to indicate factors leading to their formation of reasonable
suspicion. Officers may also check any of the ten additional circumstances on
the back of the form that may interact with the stop factors to modify or heighten
the totality of circumstances leading to the formation of reasonable suspicion. On
each side of the form—for the respective sets of stop factors or additional
circumstances—officers could check off “other.”128 Officers could check off as

124. See Stop-and-Frisk in the De Blasio Era (2019), N.Y. C.L. UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/
en/publications/stop-and-frisk-de-blasio-era-2019 [https://perma.cc/H8KM-ZRWA] (last
visited Jan. 5, 2022) (noting the “drastic decline” in stops since 2011).
125. The Stop, Question and Frisk Data, N.Y.C. OPENDATA, https://data.cityofnewyork.us/ PublicSafety/The-Stop-Question-and-Frisk-Data/ftxv-d5ix [https://perma.cc/8JUY-S2PS] (last
visited Feb. 12, 2022).
126. NYPD PATROL GUIDE (on file with author); NYPD, March 5, 2013 Service Order, NYPD (on
file with author).
127. By Decade: 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/ decennialcensus/decade.2000.html [https://perma.cc/V4HQ-8ABV]; By Decade: 2010, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/ decade.2010.html
[https://perma.cc/S8L5-FYZY].
Precinct shape files were obtained from
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/download/bytes/nypp_13c.zip. Census data were aggregated to
precinct boundaries by Infoshare.org.
INFOSHARE, www.infoshare.org
[https://perma.cc/4R92-KKUC] (last visited Feb. 12, 2022).
128. See Appendix A for a list of the additional circumstances justifying a stop.

1616

68 UCLA L. R EV. 1584 (2022)

many factors or circumstances as they felt necessary for each stop event and were
encouraged to do so.129 The NYPD mapped the stop factors and additional
circumstances from both federal130 and New York State case law131 that establish
court-sanctioned criteria to initiate stops.
Because stop circumstances are listed in a check-box format on the UF-250
form, officers could indicate any combination of reasons for the stop. We
observed over 55,000 unique combinations of stop factors and additional
circumstances in the data. Because of the large number of possible
combinations, an analysis that individuates between each combination of
suspicion factors would be complicated if not meaningless.132
Instead, we constructed a list of Reasonable Suspicion factors (RS factors)
that integrated the twenty separate stop factors or additional circumstances. We
formed a set of nine homogeneous RS factors based on behavioral or perceptual
categories of suspicion. The RS factors are listed in Table 1. The 20 stop factors or
additional circumstances on the department’s data collection forms are shown in
Appendix A.

129. March 5, 2013 Service Order, supra note 126.
130. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
Wardlow is a particularly important precedent, since more than half the stops from 2004 to
2011 invoke the criterion of high crime area as one of the additional circumstances justifying
a stop. See Grunwald and Fagan, supra note 79. See also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien
Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence
for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1605–06
(2008). The Ninth Circuit has held that “more than mere war stories are required to establish
the existence of a high-crime area” and that district courts must “examine with care the
specific data underlying any such assertion.” United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d
1122, 1139 n.32 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 218–19 (3d Cir.
2004) (Smith, J., concurring) (discussing possible burdens of proof in establishing that an area
is high-crime).
131. Both People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223 (1976) and People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 190
(N.Y. 1992) require articulable and individualized suspicion for a stop. De Bour identifies four
levels of suspicion and explains how those levels can inform appropriate police conduct. De
Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 223. For an in-depth discussion of those levels, see supra note 73 and
accompanying text.
132. From 2004 to 2009, there were 1,048,576 possible combinations of the 1024 factors each in the
stop factor and additional circumstance subsets. Fagan observed 55,753 unique combinations
of stop factors and additional circumstances in the 2048 possible combinations in these two
subsets. Report of Jeffrey Fagan at 78, Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) [hereinafter Fagan, Davis Report]. “Because stop circumstances are listed in a check-box
format on the back of the UF-250 form, officers may indicate any number of the 10
circumstances listed, or that "other" circumstances apply. Fagan Report, supra note 14, at
49. The most frequent combination was the other stop factor and high crime area additional
circumstance. That combination was checked off in 3.3 percent of the 2.8 million stops in that
period. See id., internal calculation not reported.
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For some analyses, we organized these nine categories of RS factors into two
groups based on whether these types of suspicion are grounded on objective,
behavioral criteria or subjective, perceptual criteria. Behavioral RS factors include
specific physical actions such as Casing,133 Drug Transaction, Fits Description, or
Violent Crime. Subjective or perceptual RS factors that are not based on specific
physical actions include Criminal Appearances, Evasive/Furtive Movements, and
Crime Location. We also created a category of Other that includes the “other”
option in both the list of stop factors and the list of additional circumstances.134
We created variables for each of these nine categories of suspicion with stopspecific values. Because more than one of the components of a certain factor
could be checked for a given stop, the factors were scored additively. Summary
statistics for stop characteristics, including the RS factors, and suspected crime
are shown in Table 2.

133. The circumstance of the police stop that was the focus of Terry v. Ohio was a casing incident.
See Ohio v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966), aff ’d, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Although
“casing” can describe a number of different and potentially innocuous behaviors, actions
legitimately indicative of casing either a victim or a location can justify a stop and frisk. In the
original stop of John Terry, Officer Martin McFadden observed Terry and Richard Chilton
pacing back and forth in front of a jewelry store in Cleveland’s commercial district for twelve
minutes before closing time. When Terry and Chilton were joined by a third man, Officer
McFadden began a field interrogation. Terry’s mumbled responses further raised McFadden’s
suspicion and led to a pat down and then search of Terry’s clothing that produced a loaded
automatic gun. The Terry Court celebrated Officer McFadden’s experience as sharpening his
ability to distinguish innocuous behavior from his decision that crime was “afoot.” Terry, 392
U.S. at 31. See Fagan, supra note 23, at 70 & n.171.
134. Other stop factors were checked off at frequencies that varied by type of suspected crime. See
Fagan Report, supra note 14, at 51, tbl.11 (showing frequency for each stop factor and
additional circumstance by suspected crime). Other increased over time. The content of the
text strings that accompanied this factor were analyzed as part of expert reports in litigation
and were found to be a diverse set of observations that were at times behaviorally specific (for
example, “smell of marijuana smoke”) and at times bizarrely vague (for example, “looks like a
perp”). There was no discernable pattern that would sustain meaningful disaggregation.
Moreover, even with sampling, the task of making conceptual sense of these utterances would
be unmanageable. See Fagan, Davis Report, supra note 132; Second Supplemental Report of
Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
[hereinafter Fagan, Second Supplemental Davis Report].
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Suspected Offense

Officers manually recorded the suspected offense that motivated the stop
on the stop form. In the first three years of the panel (2004–2006), the suspected
offenses were recorded in narrative form. This required extensive coding of the
texts to correspond to a set of 117 standard categories that are used by the NYPD
to categorize crime complaints, arrests, and stops.135 These categories map onto
New York Penal Law chapters, but not precisely. In the later years, the
classifications of crime categories were made by the NYPD. For purposes of this
analysis, we reduced these suspected crime categories to seven homogeneous
groupings of crimes, organized by both behavior and seriousness of the offense
(see Appendix C4).
No single crime category captured a majority of stops. Instead, stops were
as likely to be based on suspicion of property crimes or trespass as they were on
violence or weapons possession. In more than one stop in five, the suspected
crime was uncodable (for example, FEL for felony or MISD for misdemeanor)
or a noncriminal offense (for example, noncriminal violations,136 traffic violations,
or other administrative law violations). After excluding those cases, the final
analysis sample was 4,052,868 stops.
4.

Summary Statistics

Approximately 6 percent of all stops resulted in an arrest, and another 6
percent resulted in a summons being issued. Figure 1 shows the increase in stops
per year beginning in 1998 when a searchable database of stops was first created.137
Figure 2 shows the per capita stops by race from 1998–2012. Over time, Black
suspects make up the majority of stops, with Hispanic suspects second and white
135. See Fagan Report, supra note 14, at apps.C2, C3. The coding procedure resulted in the creation
of additional categories beyond the 117 created by the NYPD, to a total of 133 categories. Id.
at apps.C2–C4.
136. For example, there are civil offenses with associated fines, like for having an open container of
alcohol in public or blocking a sidewalk.
137. The searchable database was created by the NYPD in response to a request for individual-level
data on stops from the New York attorney general to the NYPD. Before that, stops were
recorded manually on UF-250 forms and stored at the precinct where the stop was recorded.
See N.Y. OFF. ATT’Y GEN., REPORT ON NYPD STOP AND FRISK PRACTICES 89–92 (1999),
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil_rights/stp_
frsk.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R3BE-3J3G].
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suspects third. Figure 2 shows the increasing share of stops of Black people
(including Black Hispanic people) over time. The share of stops that were either
white or white Hispanic people also increased over time though at a slower rate.
Figure 1: Stops Per Year, 1998–2012
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Figure 2: Per Capita Stops by Race, 1998–2012

Appendix B shows the distribution of stops across police precincts for one
year (2006) to illustrate the spatial concentrations. In addition to stops taking place
in predominantly poor and minority neighborhoods, there is a strong
concentration of stops in the Fourteenth Precinct, which encompasses midtown
Manhattan, including Times Square. This is an area of relatively few serious
(felony) crimes and very low residential population. The variation in stop rates
and precinct socioeconomic characteristics confirms the importance of precinct
controls in the analytic strategy.138
5.

Allocation of Officers

We measure officer allocations as the number of officers in each precinct in
each year who made one or more street stops. The data produced through the
Floyd litigation included a unique six-digit encrypted officer identifier for each
stop. The addition of the unique ID number permitted tracking of officers across
their stop careers. We compute estimates of officer allocations by sorting both
138. See Gelman, Fagan & Kiss, supra note 67, at 817, 821; Fagan & Davies, supra note 78, at 472
(showing the policing tactics and priorities were delegated to precinct commanders who were
“were . . . accountable to the NYPD's operational hierarchy for both their successes and their
failures to produce declining crime rates. . . . As a result, precinct commanders set the crimefighting priorities for that precinct and developed overall plans of action, based on meeting
NYPD priorities.”).
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officer ID and stop location, which enables the allocation analysis.139 Detailed
crime data with spatial coordinates were obtained as part of the Floyd litigation and
were aggregated by crime type and precinct year as a benchmark for the analysis of
officer allocation. Appendix C shows the classification of reported crimes by
aggregate categories.
C.

Analytic Strategy

We test for evidence of racially selective enforcement, including the Floyd
court’s claim of indirect profiling, using a general analytic model widely used in
discrimination research.
First, we estimate the effects of racial composition on the allocation of police,
controlling for crime rates. We assume that police allocations should be predicted
by local crime rates and that race-neutral policing would not be predicted by local
racial composition. Increasing police presence at the margins will increase the
risk of a higher exposure of people to police, and in turn, given police racial
preferences, increased police contact in places considered crime hot spots.140 To
the extent that race predicts the excess presence of police in an area, these
allocations will increase disparities in stops and their outcomes, with downstream
consequences for further criminal justice control.
Second, we test for racial differences in stop outcomes, including search,
arrest or citation, use of force, and hit rates. We control first for suspect race and
other demographic covariates, suspected crime, and then add the indicia of
reasonable suspicion that animated the stop. Third, we ask whether officers
become more efficient over time by updating their race-specific preferences for
139. This measure may censor information on officers on patrol who do not make stops but whose
presence may influence local crime rates.
140. See Fagan, supra note 71, 743 (noting that "[w]hat matters, then, in sorting out the effects of
policing, is the allocation of officers to an area, as much as does the actions of individual officers
to produce events in that area. Police produce policing events, and if the allocation of police to
areas reflects both crime rates and racial composition of the area, then allocation will
determine the racial parameters of police actions, including stops."). Wheeler, supra note 94,
at 843 (“As opposed to focusing on what the police do in hot spots, this article proposes a
proactive policing strategy that is consistent with a hot spots policing approach, but still takes
into consideration how the spatial distribution of police resources can either exacerbate or
mitigate DMC."); Coviello & Persico, supra note 67, at 322 (noting that if a precinct is assigned
more police, there will be more stops and frisks especially when allocation correlates with the
minority population in the precinct); see also Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The Case of
Policing, 82 AM. SOCIO. REV. 977 (2017); Goel, Rao & Shroff, supra note 82, at 366 (relying on
the highly localized nature of the stop and frisk policy and the empirical estimate of
discriminatory enforcement to emphasize the importance of precinct in determining disparate
treatment of minority civilians).
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stops and their hit rates. In a race-neutral stop regime, officers should update
across all stops, with no differences by suspect race. Given racial disparities in stop
rates by race, however, we test for differential updating by race. Each successive
test is increasingly rigorous in isolating the role of race—acter controlling for
offense and behavioral indicia—in the conduct and outcomes of stops.
The analytic model is a disparate treatment test. The general test for evidence
of disparate treatment is a regression equation that takes the form:
Outcome = α + βi * Minority + Σi * Plausible Nonrace Influences + ε,
and Outcome is the event or status of interest, Minority is an indicator for
the racial composition or status of the unit observed, Plausible Nonrace
Influences are a set of variables representing nonrace factors that also might
influence the outcome, and ε is an error term that captures the variation in the
outcome that cannot be explained by either Minority or Plausible Nonrace
Influences. These models may include nonrace influences that are correlated with
race.141 Each model controls for area influences by clustering standard errors by
precinct, but also by including precinct fixed effects to capture unobserved
variance in social and crime conditions at the local level.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), a seminal employment
discrimination case, offers an illustration of the practical implication of this type
of test. In a disparate treatment claim, one could test whether a high school
diploma requirement biases the hiring process because Black job applicants may
be less likely to have obtained a high school diploma. Had a race-correlated
control for high school diplomas been added to the disparate treatment model, it
would likely have reduced the racial disparity in the hiring rates—for the simple
reason that minority applicants at that time were less likely to have obtained a high
school diploma. As Ian Ayres points out,142 in a disparate treatment case, this
statistical test control for whether or not an applicant had a high school diploma is

141. For a general discussion of the specification of regression models to test for disparate
treatment, see D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV.
533 (2008). For a general discussion of how regressions sort out the influences of predictors of
an outcome, see Thomas J. Campbell, Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases: Minimum
Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1299 (1984). For an example of a disparate treatment analysis in policing, see Sharad
Goel, Maya Perelman, Ravi Shroff & David Alan Sklansky, Combatting Police Discrimination
in the Age of Big Data, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 181 (2017).
142. IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 5, 15 (2008), https://www.aclusocal.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/09/11837125-LAPD-Racial-Profiling-Report-ACLU.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/5Y2H-VQRE].
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vital to the analysis. Under a disparate treatment theory, the critical question is
whether an applicant’s race was the cause of being denied employment. If
applicants were rejected because the employer chose to hire only applicants with
a high school diploma, the applicants’ race would not be a motivating factor in the
employer’s decision (unless there was evidence to establish that the employer
adopted the diploma requirement with the intention of excluding minority
applicants from the workforce). The goal in specifying these models is to identify
the effects of race on outcomes after controlling for other, potentially relevant
factors, even if they are correlated with race. Failure to do so raises the risk of
“omitted variable bias,” which could lead to erroneous conclusions about the
effects of variables that do appear in a regression test.143
We test for the effects of race using a series of Ordinary Least Squares
regression (OLS) procedures. In the test for bias in the allocation of police officers,
we employ a specification with the logged estimate of the officer allocations to
precincts,144 an adjustment to the overdispersion of the rate of allocation of
officers that reduces the undue influence and leverage of extreme values in a
distribution.145
In the later models, we use OLS regression models with a continuous
response variable to estimate the effects of race on stop rates and outcomes. OLS
is commonly used to estimate the factors that influence the distribution of a
response variable given a set of predictor or independent variables. OLS results
can also identify the strength of the relationships between the independent and
response or dependent variables.146 OLS is usually used to predict the values of a
continuous response variable, but it can also be adopted for use with dichotomous

143. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Testing for Discrimination and the Problem of “Included Variable Bias,”
(Yale L. Sch. Working Paper, 2010), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1138ayresincludedvariablebias.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBA2-8BXX] (last visited Jan. 6, 2022)
(distinguishing between the errors of interpretation that result when race-correlated variables
are excluded or included in a regression model). See also Ian Ayres, Three Tests for Measuring
Unjustified Disparate Impacts in Organ Transplantation, 48 PERSPS. BIOLOGY & MED. S68, S76
(2005).
144. Willard G. Manning & John Mullahy, Estimating Log Models: To Transform or Not to
Transform?, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 461, 464–66 (2001) (comparing methods for regression
models with both log normal ed and continuous forms of the response variable).
145. Richard A. Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: Déja Vu All Over
Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303, 305 (2005) ("The farther values for the explanatory
variables fall from the centers of their distributions, the more ‘leverage’ they have. When such
values tend to be paired with values for the response variable that fall some distance from the
center of the response distribution, leverage becomes ‘influence.’”).
146. Graeme Hutcheson, Ordinary Least-Squares Regression, in THE MULTIVARIATE SOCIAL SCIENTIST
56 (Graeme Hutcheson & Nick Sofroniou eds., 1999); J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE,
REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA (3rd ed. 2001).
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or binary response variables. An OLS regression with a binary dependent variable
expresses the probability change associated with a unit change in the predictor
variable. In a design with multiple predictor variables, OLS computes that change
in probability for each independent variable. The model takes the form of:
Yi = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + · · · + βk Xki + ui
and Yi is the outcome of interest (0 or 1), β0 is the intercept, and βx represents
the concurrent effects of a set of explanatory variables or predictors of that
outcome. In other words, β1X1i expresses the change in the probability that Y = 1
where there is an associated unit change in X1 and each successive β
simultaneously expresses the effect of a unit change in each X on the value of Y. In
this multivariate model, OLS provides a probability for each X or predictor
variable. The value of each β can be either positive or negative. When the β
is large and positive, Pr(Y = 1) approaches 1 and is statistically significant. When
the β is large and negative, Pr(Y = 1) approaches its 0 value and is statistically
significant. In a multivariate model, each β is adjusted for each of the other X
predictors. In other words, a positive (or negative) coefficient for β1 means
that an increase in Xj increases (or decreases) the probability of Y = 1. One of the
advantages of using an OLS estimate is that increases (or decreases) in the
coefficient relative to a neutral value of 1 can be expressed as a percentage, to
simplify interpretation.
The advantage of this formulation is that each ߚj can be interpreted as the
percent that the predictor increases (or decreases) the probability of the outcome
variable. In this case, we are interested in the outcome of a Terry stop, and race—
the predictor of interest—is included in the vector x of predictors. Accordingly, we
can calculate the percent increase or decrease in the outcome or response variable
based on a unit change in the race predictor. We iterate models starting with a
baseline model with only race and fixed effects for each year and police precinct
and then extend the model to include additional groups of predictors organized in
categories of interest.

III.
A.

RESULTS

Allocation of Police

We estimate the effect of race on officer allocation, controlling for lagged
crime rates. We lag the crime rates by one month, assuming that police respond
to a change in the crime rate from month 1 with an increase in police presence
the following month. In these estimates, we include borough-fixed effects in
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lieu of precinct-fixed effects, since officers are reassigned, often from one precinct
to another, within a borough over the course of a year.147

147. There are seventy-six police precincts in New York City, including a precinct (22) in Central
Park. Each borough (county) includes between five and sixteen police precincts based on
population density. See Appendix B for map of stops by precinct.
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Table 3 shows a series of regressions to assess whether local racial
composition influences officer allocations. Models 1 and 2 show that local racial
composition is a significant predictor of officer allocations, even after
controlling for other nonracial factors including crime, demography, and
social conditions. Model 3 includes local crime rates in the past year. The effect
size for the racial composition variables declines for % Black but remains
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positive and significant. The effect for the Latinx population becomes negative
and significant, a reflection perhaps of the diversity of neighborhood contexts
and social stratification of Latinx people in New York City.148
When we control for borough effects in Model 4, the effect for % Black
increases substantially, and the effect for % Hispanic is no longer significant but is
now positive, suggesting that stop rates may increase as the share of the Hispanic
population increases by precinct.149 Model 5 includes crime, social and economic
covariates for the precinct, and borough-fixed effects. Including the crime rate
reduces the significance of the % Black coefficient, and the % Latinx coefficient
remains unchanged. Overall, allocations of officers are responsive to violent crime
rates, yet the percentage size of the Black population in a precinct remains a
significant predictor of officer allocations at the p<.10 level.

148. Latinx population and its stratification were estimated from Nueva York and Beyond: The
Latino Communities of the Tri-State Area, HISP. FED’N, https://hispanicfederation.org/
advocacy/reports/nueva_york_and_beyond_the_latino_communities_of_the_tristate_area [https://perma.cc/GU4Q-CTLN] (last visited Feb. 12, 2022). See also, LAWRENCE
MISHEL, ECON. POL’Y INST., DIVERSITY IN THE NEW YORK CITY UNION AND NONUNION
CONSTRUCTION SECTORS (2017), https://files.epi.org/pdf/119517.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KA5H-KJYQ].
149. We include borough-fixed effects since some officers in specialized patrol units were
reassigned to commands in different boroughs over the study period. See Jeffrey Fagan & Lila
Nojima, Are Police Officers Bayesians? Police Updating in Investigative Stops (Conf. on
Empirical Legal Studs., Draft, 2019).
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Figure 3, from Model 5 in Table 3, shows the rate of officers allocated per
precinct relative to two types of crime complaints: (1) violence and weapons
complaints and (2) other crime complaints, reflecting the emphasis on control of
violence in New York City’s policing regime.150 The lines are estimated with a
range of 2 standard deviations from the mean complaint rate. We apply a
logarithmic expression of police allocations to control for skew in the
allocation by precinct. Allocations are more sensitive to changes in nonviolent
crime rates, including property, drug and quality of life crimes, with a sharp
increase in officers allocated at the right side of the distribution of nonviolent
offenses. For violent crimes, officer allocations increase steadily from the lower
to the upper end of the distribution of complaints. The contrasts in the patterns
are notable; allocations are relatively insensitive to increases in nonviolent crimes
at lower rates of crime complaints but rise quickly at the extreme of the rates of
nonviolent crimes.

150. The emphasis on policing strategy and tactics on reducing violence, especially gun violence,
was formalized and incorporated into policing strategy by the NYPD early in the first year of
the Giuliani administration in conjunction with the ascension of the broken windows strategy
and the development of the stop and frisk program. See GIULIANI & BRATTON, POLICING
STRATEGY NO. 1, supra note 112, and GIULIANI & BRATTON, POLICING STRATEGY NO. 5, supra
note 112.
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While allocations of officers are in fact responsive to local crime rates, both
in this and prior analyses,151 Table 4 breaks down allocations of officers to
precincts to increments in the concentrations of Black or Hispanic residents. Each
model estimates effects compared to the precincts with the lowest percentages of
Black or Hispanic residents.
As concentrations of Black residents increase, officer allocations also
increase. At each level of Black and Latinx population concentration, there are
more officers controlling for crime than in precincts with the lowest
concentrations of Black and Hispanic residents.
B.

Estimating Disparate Treatment in Stops

Using case-level data, we estimate disparate treatment using a set of OLS
regressions with several measures of “hit rate.” Each model is estimated first
without the inclusion of the RS factors (OLS (1)), and then with these factors
included as fixed effects but without a linear time trend (FE (2)), and then with
precinct-specific time trends (FE (3)). These tests address in part the Floyd court’s
claim that race and suspicion co-vary. To examine whether suspicion itself is a
race-specific attribution, we estimate sanctions and seizures with interactions of
race by each suspicion factor. The dependent variables are:
1) Summons: whether the stop resulted in a summons (1) or not (0).
2) Arrest: whether the stop resulted in an arrest (1) or not (0).
3) Arrest conditional on any sanction: whether there was an arrest (1) or
summons (0), for those receiving any sanction, reflecting the officer’s
choice of sanction.
4) Seizure: whether the stop resulted in the officer discovering an illegal
item, including firearms, other weapons, or contraband (1) or not (0).
5) Frisk: whether the suspect was frisked during the course of the stop (1) or
not (0).

151. Fagan, supra note 71.
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6) Search: whether the suspect was searched during the course of the stop
(1) or not (0).
7) Contraband: whether the stop resulted in the officer discovering illegal
contraband, such as drugs (1) or not (0).
8) Firearms: whether the stop resulted in the officer discovering a firearm
(1) or not (0).
9) Knives: whether the stop resulted in the officer discovering a knife (1) or
not (0).
10) Any Weapon: whether the stop resulted in the officer discovering a
firearm or a knife (1) or not (0).
11) Force: whether the officer used any of several types of physical force with
the suspect during the course of the stop (1) or not (0).
1.

Arrests and Summons

Table 5 shows the results for arrests, summons, and arrests or summons. To
test for precinct effects of local crime and social conditions, we estimated the
models first as OLS regressions without precinct-fixed effects, and then we
reestimated the models including precinct fixed effects. We use the following OLS
equation, illustrated here with Sanction as the dependent variable and several
controls for suspect characteristics, event (suspected crime) characteristics, local
crime rates, and social conditions:
Sanction = β0 + β1 Black + β2 Black Hispanic + β3 White Hispanic + β4 Age
+ β5 Female + Suspicion factors + Precinct fixed effects
+ Year fixed effects + Precinct*Year fixed effects
+ Suspected Crime fixed effects + ε
(2)

Sanction = β0 + β1 Black + β2 Black Hispanic + β3 White Hispanic + β4 Age

+ β5 Female + Suspicion factors + Suspicion factors*Black
+ Suspicion factors*Black Hispanic + Suspicion factors*White Hispanic
+ Precinct fixed effects + Year fixed effects + Precinct*Year fixed effects
+ Suspected Crime fixed effects + ε
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Black, Black Hispanic, and White Hispanic are dummy variables indicating
that a person of that race was stopped. Model (2) is the same as model (1) except it
incorporates additional terms that associate the RS factors with the three race
dummy variables.
The third set of models in Table 5 (in columns 7–9) are two-step arrest
models. In this formulation, arrests are a two-stage process: the officer must first
choose whether or not the person deserves some sort of sanction. Then, the officer
must choose to arrest the person or issue a summons. Accordingly, we estimate
arrest as a choice conditional on the decision to sanction. We first use a logistic
model to estimate the probability of sanction and add the predicted probability
of sanction to the estimation of which members of the sanction group are
arrested. The model is:
(3)
Arrest = β0 + β1 Black + β2 Black Hispanic + β3 White Hispanic + β4 Age
+ β5 Female + Precinct fixed effects + Year fixed effects
+ Precinct*Year fixed effects + Suspected Crime fixed effects
+ Probability of Sanction + ε

where Probability of Sanction is a predicted value from equation (1) where
Sanction is the lefthand variable.
Table 5 shows no evidence of bias in the decision to arrest Blacks pursuant to
a stop. An OLS model without controls for local effects suggests arrest decision
bias in that Blacks are significantly less likely to be arrested. Once we control for
both precinct-fixed effects and precinct by time fixed effects, we find no signs of
bias in the decision to arrest. Since stop rates for these three minority groups are
significantly higher,152 the burden of stops that yield no returns to police falls
heavily on minorities.

152. Fagan Report, supra note 14.
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OLS (1)
-0.007
(0.004)
0.001
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.003)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

76

6.41%
89%

Table 5. OLS Regressions for Arrest Made or Summons Issued Controlling for the Type of Crime
Arrest
Summons
Model
FE (2)
FE (3)
OLS (1)
FE (2)
Black
*
0.001
0.001
-0.002
-0.016
***
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.004)
(0.003)
Black Hispanic
0.002
0.003
0.001
-0.009
***
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.002)
-0.002
-0.001
0.003
-0.003
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.002)
White Hispanic

Mean outcome
5.77%
% Non-White Suspects(a)
89%
P-value of  0 : υ = 0
Number of precincts
76
76
Cluster SE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Time FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Precincts FE
No
Yes
Yes
No
Crime FE(c)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Time FE * Precincts FE
No
No
Yes
No
Significance: * = p < .10, ** = p < .05, *** p < .01
a. N=4,086,118 suspects. Other Race and Unknown Race suspects excluded. N=76 precincts
b. This is choice model of arrest or summons given a stop.

FE (3)
-0.016
(0.002)
-0.009
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.002)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

76

***
***

OLS (1)
-0.009
(0.005)
0.001
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.004)

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Arrest or Summons(b)
FE (2)
FE (3)
*
-0.015
***
-0.015
(0.003)
(0.003)
-0.007
**
-0.006
(0.003)
(0.003)
-0.004
*
-0.004
(0.002)
(0.002)

76

12.00%
89%

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

76

***

**

*
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The second panel in Table 5 (columns 4–6) suggests that Black and Black
Hispanic suspects are significantly less likely to receive a summons, the less serious
form of sanction, compared to white suspects. White Hispanic suspects are no
more or less likely than white suspects to receive a summons as an outcome of a
stop. The effect emerges in models that control for precinct crime conditions.
Again, given the higher stop rates for all three racial and ethnic minorities, the
significant negative coefficients suggest bias in summons as an outcome of a stop:
while Black and Hispanic individuals bear the heaviest burden of stops, they are
less likely to receive a summons. The results suggest that although Black and
Latinx people are stopped more often, they are sanctioned less, a sign or weak
indicia of suspicion that motivated the stop. This is the pattern of stops that
the Floyd court characterized as “indirect racial profiling.”153
We find the same to be true in the third panel, which examines the discretion
of police officers to either make an arrest or issue a summons. Given this choice,
the results in Model 9 show that Black and Hispanic suspects were less likely than
white suspects to be arrested rather than issued a summons. The higher arrest
rate—conditional on a stop—of white suspects suggests that their stops were more
likely based on a higher standard of probable cause. That is, stops of the small
percentage of white suspects (11 percent) were more accurate in detecting
criminality. Again, the overwhelming burden of inaccurate but intrusive stops
and street detentions falls on Black and Hispanic individuals.
The negative effects for Black and Black Hispanic suspects suggest that
police are making a high number of stops for Black and Hispanic suspects that fail
to yield returns in crime detection, at least as proxied by the arrest, summons, and
sanction variables. This may suggest inequitable use of the bases of suspicion that
animate these stops: stops are inaccurate with respect to whether crime is afoot
more often for these racial and ethnic groups.
2.

Sanctions and Reasonable Suspicion

We turn next to address whether officers’ attributions of reasonable
suspicion are race neutral. The counterfactual is that officers stereotype suspect
behavior into distinct categories using behavioral or subjective perceptions. The
strategy in this analysis is to compare the subjective factors of Furtive Movements,
Crime Location, Other, Suspicious Object, and Criminal Appearances with
objective, behavioral bases of suspicion. These omitted, behavioral categories

153. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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are Violent Crime, Casing, Drug Transaction, and Fits Description. The
strategy allows for scrutiny of the more elastic and perceptually based indicia
of reasonable suspicion while remaining cognizant of the fact that they may
be constitutionally permissible in certain circumstances.154
We combine arrest or summons in Table 6 into a single parameter of
sanction and test for the effects of the RS factors on sanctions. We omit the RS
factor of Fits Description, so the results for each RS factor are relative to the omitted
factor. We include the categories of suspected crime (see Appendix C) as fixed
effects. As before, standard errors are clustered by precinct.

154. See id. at 567 (“[T]he proper inquiry is not whether each fact considered in isolation denotes
unlawful behavior, but whether all the facts taken together support a reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing.”).
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-.003
(0.006)
.006
(0.005)
.002
(0.005)

.121 ***
(0.005)
No
No
No
No
Yes
4,086,118
.000

No
No
No
No
Yes
4,052,868
.009

-.002
(0.005)
.009
(0.004)
.004
(0.004)
.001
(0.000)
.033
(0.003)
.013
(0.001)
-.009
(0.001)
.036
(0.003)
.030
(0.003)
.018
(0.002)
.066
(0.005)
**

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Yes
No
No
No
Yes
4,052,868
.010

-.002
(0.005)
.009
(0.004)
.004
(0.004)
.001
(0.000)
.033
(0.003)
.013
(0.001)
-.010
(0.001)
.036
(0.003)
.030
(0.003)
.017
(0.002)
.059
(0.006)
**

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
4,052,868
.017

-.009
(0.003)
-.001
(0.003)
.000
(0.002)
.001
(0.000)
.032
(0.003)
.013
(0.001)
-.008
(0.001)
.036
(0.003)
.030
(0.003)
.018
(0.003)
.025
(0.007)

***

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
4,052,868
.021

-.010
(0.003)
.000
(0.003)
.001
(0.002)
.001
(0.000)
.030
(0.003)
.011
(0.001)
-.007
(0.001)
.037
(0.003)
.027
(0.003)
.015
(0.003)
.038
(0.007)

***

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
4,052,868
.028

-.010
(0.003)
.000
(0.003)
.001
(0.002)
.001
(0.000)
.029
(0.003)
.012
(0.001)
-.007
(0.001)
.037
(0.003)
.028
(0.003)
.016
(0.002)
.107
(0.004)

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

Table 6. OLS Regressions of Any Sanction (Arrest or Summons) by Suspect Characteristics and Reasonable Suspicion (b,
SE)
Predictors
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Black
Black Hispanic
White Hispanic
Age
Female
RS_fac2
RS_fac3
RS_fac5
RS_fac7
RS_fac8
Constant

Year FE
Precinct FE
Suspected Crime FE
Time FE * Precincts FE
Clustered SE
N
R2
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The main effects for race and ethnicity change in small ways when the RS
factors are included in the model. The negative coefficient for Black suspects
becomes significant in Model 4 when we add precinct fixed effects, which carries
with it information about variations in crime and stop rates by precinct. It remains
significant as additional controls are added. Again, Black suspects, who are most
frequently stopped, are the least likely to be sanctioned. Whatever the formation
of suspicion, it led to a lower hit rate in the detection of a crime or a violation. There
is little change when we add in a fixed effect for suspected crime in Models 5 and 6.
Some models show that Black Hispanic suspects are less likely to be sanctioned
in either manner but that effect becomes insignificant with additional controls.
The overall effect suggests that Black suspects, who are stopped far more per
capita than other racial groups, are less likely to be sanctioned. The cost of the stop
is externalized to them with no discernable return in crime detection.
The results in Table 6 showing which RS factors influence the stop outcome
suggest an interesting though mixed pattern. The model is structured so that each
RS factor is compared to the omitted factor (Fits Description). All are significant
and positive, with the exception of crime location. Compared to the objective and
behavioral bases of suspicion that motivate stops such as casing or violent actions,
sanctions seem to be more likely when stops are based on more subjective factors.
The negative sign on crime location as a predictor of an arrest or sanction is not
surprising given its widespread and somewhat indiscriminate use.155
3.

Arrests Versus Summons

Arrests carry greater punishment liability than summons, and this greater
sanction cost makes the decisions to arrest versus summons a potentially more
consequential net effect of the suspected crime. Therefore, any bias or selectivity
would impose a greater punishment cost on the affected group. To estimate this
potential bias and associated burden, we reestimated the regressions from Table
6 with two differences. First, we included only those suspects who were given a
sanction (reducing the number of observations from 4.1 million to 490,000).
Second, we add a parameter—p(sanction)—which controls for the selection of

155. Grunwald & Fagan, supra note 79, at 350 (showing that police in New York indicate crime
location or high crime area as a basis of suspicion in over 50 percent of all stops, but that they
report nearly every area as high crime regardless of its actual crime rate). The suspect’s race
and the racial composition of the stop location predicts the use of crime location as a basis of
suspicion. Id. at 351.
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suspects for any sanction among the total population of persons stopped.
Although such selection models have been criticized methodologically,156 the
SQF database lacked sufficient information to conduct a more formal matching or
propensity score model to compare sanctioned and nonsanctioned persons
among the full stop population. Accordingly, the results in Table 7 estimate
differences by race in the decision to arrest versus summons, controlling for the RS
factors, precinct effects, suspected crime, and the decision to impose any sanction.

156. See Ross M. Stolzenberg & Daniel A. Relles, Theory Testing in a World of Constrained
Research Design: The Significance of Heckman’s Censored Sampling Bias Correction for
Nonexperimental Research, 18 SOCIO. METHODS & RSCH. 395 (1990); Patrick A. Puhani, The
Heckman Correction for Sample Selection and Its Critique, 14 J. ECON SURVS. 53 (2000); Neil &
Winship, supra note 90; Siu Fai Leung & Shihti Yu, On the Choice Between Sample Selection
and Two-Part Models, 72 J. ECONOMETRICS 197 (1996).
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.497 ***
(0.021)

-.018
(0.026)
.000
(0.022)
-.024
(0.018)

.550
***
(0.026)

-.009
(0.025)
.006
(0.022)
-.019
(0.018)
-.002
***
(0.000)
.013
(0.011)
-.024
***
(0.004)
-.011
**
(0.005)
.079
***
(0.012)
-.052
***
(0.012)
.135
***
(0.008)

Yes
No
No
No
Yes
487,441
.026

.527
(0.030)

-.011
(0.024)
.002
(0.022)
-.022
(0.018)
-.002
(0.000)
.011
(0.010)
-.027
(0.004)
-.014
(0.005)
.084
(0.011)
-.050
(0.011)
.133
(0.008)

No
No
No
No
Yes
490,252
.000

No
No
No
No
Yes
487,441
.020

***

***
***
***
***
***

***

***

***
**
***
***
***
***
***

***

***

***
***
***
*
***

***

***

*

***

***

***

***

***

.068
(0.012)
.046
(0.011)
.014
(0.010)
-.001
(0.000)
-.008
(0.006)
-.012
(0.003)
-.009
(0.003)
.055
(0.007)
.013
(0.008)
.106
(0.007)
***

.070
(0.012)
.046
(0.012)
.013
(0.011)
-.002
(0.000)
-.008
(0.007)
-.013
(0.003)
-.011
(0.003)
.059
(0.008)
.014
(0.008)
.113
(0.007)
***

.078
(0.012)
.051
(0.012)
.015
(0.011)
-.002
(0.000)
.016
(0.007)
-.021
(0.003)
-.009
(0.003)
.073
(0.010)
-.040
(0.010)
.121
(0.007)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
487,441
.154

.574 ***
(0.020)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
487,441
.129

.861 ***
(0.026)
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
487,441
.096

.778 ***
(0.024)

Table 7. OLS Regressions of Arrest Conditional on Any Sanction by Suspect Characteristics and Reasonable Suspicion (b, SE)
Predictors
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Black
Black Hispanic
White Hispanic
Age
Female
RS_fac2
RS_fac3
RS_fac5
RS_fac7
RS_fac8
P (any sanction)
Constant

2

Year FE
Precinct FE
Suspected Crime FE
Time FE * Precincts FE
Clustered SE
N
R

(7)
.077
(0.012)
.046
(0.011)
.014
(0.010)
-.003
(0.000)
-.034
(0.009)
-.023
(0.005)
-.003
(0.004)
.022
(0.011)
-.012
(0.010)
.092
(0.008)
0.812
-0.215
.546
(0.020)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
487,441
.154

***
***

***
***
***
***
***
***

***
***
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Given the choice between summons and arrest, Table 7 shows that police
prefer to make arrests over summons for Black and Black Hispanic suspects and
issue the less burdensome and stigmatizing sanction of a summons to white
suspects relatively more often. We observe no difference between white Hispanic
suspects from white suspects. Black suspects are 7.7 percent more likely to be
arrested and Black Hispanic suspects are 4.6 percent more likely compared to
white suspects to be arrested. As in the previous analysis, the race effects become
significant when precinct fixed effects are added to the model (Models 4–7). These
results are robust to the inclusion of controls and statistically significant.
Again, many of the RS factors based on perception, compared to objective
behavioral factors, are significant. Arrests are more likely when reasonable
suspicion is based on Other, or Criminal Appearances. Arrests are less likely when
suspicion is based on Crime Location, Furtive Movements, or Suspicious Object.
Adding the sanction propensity predictor in Model 7 increases the effects for
Crime Location while decreasing the effect of others.
Evidence of bias emerges in two ways in these estimates. First, Black people
in New York in the SQF regime appear to be sanctioned 1 percent less, suggesting
over-elevated stop rates. While the marginal difference may appear small, it must
be compared to a base rate of sanctioning of 12 percent (see Table 2). Moreover,
the effects are substantial when applied to the entire sample of 4.4 million stops,
among who more than half are Black. Next, after controlling for crime severity and
the bases of reasonable suspicion, and given that they are sanctioned, Black and
Black Hispanic suspects are 7.7 percent and 4.6 percent more likely, respectively,
to receive the harsher sanction of arrest over the lesser burden of a summons
once the decision to sanction has been made.
C.

Race, Sanctions and Reasonable Suspicion

In the Floyd opinion, the court raised the possibility that the low hit rates
for Black and Hispanic individuals could be the result of either inaccurate
application of the RS factors, or biased application of those factors that would
perhaps be used to justify a higher stop or arrest rate.157 Accordingly, we
estimated a set of OLS regressions to see if there were biases in the use of each
RS factor by suspect race or ethnicity. We regressed dummy variables for Black,
Black Hispanic, and white Hispanic on each of the nine RS factors. Table 8

157. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 585.
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shows the results of these regressions, which were estimated with fixed effects
for year, precinct, suspected crime, and year by precinct fixed effects.
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1
Fits
Description
0.008
(0.006)

0.046
(0.011)

2
Evasive/
Furtive
0.052
(0.010)

***

0.058
(0.012)

3
Crime
Location
0.095
(0.010)

***

0.035
(0.012)

0.029
(0.012)

.053

.140

0.006
(0.004)

-0.006
(0.002)

*
***

-0.001
(0.002)

.015

-0.009
(0.002)
4,052,868

9

Violent
Crime
0.010
(0.002)

0.009
(0.002)

.053

***
0.006
(0.001)
4,052,868

***

8
Criminal
Appearances
-0.005
**
(0.002)

***

.120

0.003
(0.003)
4,052,868

7
Suspicious
Object
-0.002
(0.004)
***

-0.032
(0.005)

.357

-0.004
(0.001)
4,052,868

***

***

.110

-0.022
(0.005)
4,052,868

-0.030
(0.006)

Table 8. OLS Regression of Reasonable Suspicion Factors by Suspect Race or Ethnicity
Reasonable Suspicion Factor
4
5
6
Drug
Suspect
Casing
Other
Transaction
Race/Ethnicity
Black
***
***
**
***
-0.003
(0.002)
Black Hispanic

-0.006
(0.006)

.074

***
0.021
***
0.055
***
0.031
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.009)
4,052,868
4,052,868
4,052,868

White Hispanic

.062

-0.025
(0.005)
4,052,868

N
R2

Note. Regressions include fixed effects for year, precinct, suspected crime, and year * precinct interactions. Standard errors clustered by precinct.
Significance: * : p < .05, ** : p < .01; *** : p < .001

***

***

***
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Officers are more likely to check off subjective factors such as Furtive
Movements or Crime Location for Black and Latinx suspects compared to white
suspects, and conversely less likely to focus on specific behavioral factors such as
Drug Transactions or Criminal Appearances.158 Officers were more likely to check
off objective factors such as Violent Crime and Casing for Black and Hispanic
suspects. The factors that officers prefer to check off more often for white suspects
are Drug Transactions, Criminal Appearances, and Other.
Overall, while there are racial preferences that are specific to the
application of many RS factors, they are not necessarily differentiated by the
subjective nature of those factors. Combined with the large coefficients on the
subjective RS factors in Tables 6 and 7, race-specific formulations of suspicion may
be animating decisions to sanction, as well as decisions about which sanction to
use. But race-specific formulations of suspicion may not necessarily drive the
decision to stop a civilian.
We address this question further in a series of regressions that include
interactions of each race group by each RS factor and we display the results
graphically. Here, we test whether there are race-specific patterns of suspicion
that influence several stop outcomes. In each graph, effects above 0 indicate a
positive coefficient on the interaction term—the stop outcome for that race RS
factor grouping is more likely for each race group compared to whites. For each
outcome, we first test a baseline model with only the suspect race included and
next tested only the subjective RS factors. The results are shown with the
coefficient value and the 95 percent confidence intervals for equation 2 above. This
strategy provides estimates of the effects of each subjective RS factor relative to the
effects of the objective RS factors.
We begin this set of analyses to determine if there are race-specific suspicion
patterns that influence the decision to issue any sanction—either an arrest or a
158. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Montero-Camargo, notes the subjectivity intrinsic to a
crime location basis of suspicion:
Without hesitation, the majority treats this as a crime wave, but is it really? Does
an arrest every four months or so make for a high crime area? . . . . Can we rely
on the vague and undocumented recollections of the officers here? Do the two
officers’ figures of “15–20” and “about a dozen” reflect separate pools of
incidents, or do they include some where, as here, both officers were involved?
Are such estimates sufficiently precise to tell us anything useful about the area?
I wouldn’t have thought so, although I could be persuaded otherwise. But my
colleagues don’t even pause to ask the questions. To them, it’s a high crime
area, because the officers say it’s a high crime area. Just as a man with a hammer
sees every problem as a nail, so a man with a badge may see every corner of his
beat as a high crime area.
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
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summons. Figure 4 shows where any sanction (arrest or summons) is the
dependent variable. As before, the regressions control for suspected crime and
for precinct, year, and precinct by year fixed effects. The first set of bars on the left
shows the base rate estimate for each race/ethnicity dummy variable. For each RS
factor, we also show its frequency overall in the universe of stops beneath the factor
name.

The base estimates in Figure 4 shows again that Black suspects may be less
likely overall to receive a sanction after they are stopped. Figure 4 suggests that
Hispanic suspects are less likely to be sanctioned when Crime Location or
Suspicious Object are indicated as part of the officer’s calculation of reasonable
suspicion. Black suspects are less likely to be sanctioned when Evasive/Furtive
or Suspicious Object are indicated. All minorities are around 3 percent more
likely to be sanctioned, however, where a Criminal Appearances factor is
indicated. But the base rate for Criminal Appearances is low: this factor is
indicated in only 5.8 percent of stops while Crime Location or Suspicious Object
are indicated in 73 percent and 15 percent of stops, respectively.
Overall, the pattern of negative coefficients suggests that these subjective
factors are unequally utilized markers of suspicion that turn out to be inaccurate
precursors of criminality at the conclusion of a stop. Only Criminal Appearances,
among these factors, seem to lead to stops that result in either an arrest or a
summons for more minorities than whites. Recall that Criminal Appearances

No Runs, Few Hits, and Many Errors

1647

include associations with known criminals and physical signs of criminal
activity. Appearances also reflect bias, especially physical appearance.159 The
preference for arrests given the presence of this factor is troubling for two
reasons. First, there is an absence of direct evidence or suspicion of criminal
behavior in the components of this factor. Second, the components are
premised solely on the presence of circumstantial or associational characteristics.
In other words, sanctions in these circumstances are less well grounded in
behavioral manifestations than in subjective or probabilistic assessments of crime.
The importance of vagueness in the RS factors motivating a stop is evident
from the fact that at least half of the sanctions resulting from stops—whether
arrests or summons—turn out to be false positives: that is, stops that result in
no ultimate conviction nor a seizure of weapons or contraband.160 Such
inchoate suspicion, then, based on simple appearances,161 may be even less
efficient than these data suggest. And the fact that our earlier results show that this
RS factor is invoked at an equivalent rate for Black and Hispanic suspects as for
white suspects—despite the wide disparity in the overall number of stops—
suggests that in these instances, police officers may be doing nothing more than
relying on their own subjective assessment of the base rates for each group.
We repeat this analysis to assess which RS factors influence the conditional
decision to choose arrest over summons for those subjected to any sanction.
Figure 5 shows that these conditional arrest decisions also vary by race, as shown
earlier and again in Figure 5 in the lefthand panel (the Base comparisons). Black
and Black Hispanic suspects are more likely than white suspects to be arrested
conditional on being sanctioned, after controlling for the suspected crime and the
overall pattern of RS factors.

159. See generally Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie & Davies, supra note 84. See Graham & Lowery, supra
note 84.
160. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. STATE OFF. ATT’Y GEN., C.R. BUREAU, A REPORT ON ARRESTS
ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES (2013).
161. Samaha, supra note 18 (citing broken windows theory and order-maintenance policing as
regimes that rely entirely on appearances where there is some unknown ex-ante probability of
criminal activity given the presence of a physical gesture or environmental feature). The risk
of error, based on cognitive distortion and bias in those perceptions, is significant and raises
concerns about the liberty incursions that take place based on that error. See Sampson, supra
note 77.
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The interactions show that Black and Black Hispanic suspects are less likely
to be arrested (and more likely to be given a summons) when Criminal
Appearances or Suspicious Object are checked as the basis of the stop. They are
about 6 percent more likely to be subject to a custody arrest, however, compared
to white suspects when Other162 is checked (22.3 percent of stops). These
disparities by race suggest that the higher burden of the more punitive arrest
outcome is more often placed on minorities than whites and that some of this
difference can be traced to a high rate of minority conditional arrests when Other
(22.3 percent of stops) is the reason for a stop. The disparity by race is also evident
in the base coefficients on the left side of Figure 5. The higher incidence of arrest
when RS factors are subjective if not inchoate suggests a form of managerial justice
where misdemeanor sanctions (often for bailable detention) are given for the least
serious antisocial behavior based less on individual than collective or group-based
suspicion.”163

162. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 573 n.104 (citing Fagan, Second Supplemental Report, supra note
134, for a description of the text strings for other bases of suspicion).
163. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME (2018); Alexandra Natapoff, The
High Stakes of Low-Level Criminal Justice, 128 YALE L.J. 1648 (2019); ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN,
MISDEMEANORLAND (2018).
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Race, Seizures, and Reasonable Suspicion

We repeat the interaction analysis from Figure 4, this time examining
seizures of guns, other weapons, or any other contraband as the variable
Seizures.164 We collapse the separate categories of seizures into one given the low
base rates for each type of seizure.165 The base model shows that contraband or
weapons recoveries were significantly less likely for all Black and Hispanic
population groups. All three effects were significant (p < .01). Seizures were
slightly more likely when Black and Hispanic suspects were stopped on the basis of
Criminal Appearances. Large negative coefficients were found for stops based on
Suspicious Objects, and the effects were strong and consistent for all three Black
and Hispanic groups at around -5 percent.

These results suggest that at least one subjective factor—Suspicious
Objects—is used in a racially discriminatory manner by officers. Perhaps it is
a pretextual reason for conducting a stop, or perhaps it reflects an
164. Weapons, stolen property, drugs, or other prohibited goods such as fireworks or unlicensed
cigarettes.
165. From 2004 to 2012, firearms were recovered in 0.14 percent of 4.43 million stops. Other
weapons were seized in 0.93 percent and other contraband in 1.77 percent. See Floyd, 959 F.
Supp. 2d at 582 n.167 (citing Fagan Report, supra note 14, at 63).
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attributional bias in how officers view the belongings of Black and Hispanic
suspects (such as backpacks, shopping bags, electronic equipment). When
police were looking for guns, which was the primary goal of the stop and frisk
tactic,166 they were significantly more inaccurate for Black and Hispanic
suspects than they were for white suspects. These observational data are not
helpful to sort out whether the greater error rates for Black and Hispanic
suspects were a result of officers exercising more restraint with white
suspects or a result of more elastic interpretations of the Suspicious Object
factor for Black and Hispanic suspects. Either interpretation points to
disparate treatment of non-white suspects.
We also disaggregated seizures by seizure type. Figure 7 shows the
coefficients on race and ethnicity groups for equation 1 where the lefthand side
variables are Firearms, Knives, Any Weapons, and Contraband. Black and
Hispanic suspects are .4–.7 percent less likely to have contraband and knives, while
Blacks are .05 percent more likely to have a firearm. This tiny coefficient is
statistically significant but practically insignificant. Overall, minority stops are
slightly less likely to result in a seizure.

166. See GIULIANI & BRATTON, POLICING STRATEGY NO. 5, supra note 112.

No Runs, Few Hits, and Many Errors

1651

Figure 7. Regression Coefficients for Seizures by
Seizure Type (b, 95% Cl)
0.002
0
‐0.002

Firearms

Knives

Any Weapon

Any Contraband

‐0.004
‐0.006
‐0.008
‐0.01
‐0.012
Black

Black Hispanic

White Hispanic

The discussion touches on only a portion of the significant coefficients in
the models comprising Figures 4–7. In fact, about two in three race and ethnicity
coefficients were statistically significant, and most were negative. The negative
interactions suggest, simply, that controlling for the basis of suspicion, Black, Black
Hispanic, and white Hispanic suspects are less likely to generate hits in the form of
sanctions or seizures. This is precisely the pattern that the Floyd court cited as
evidence of indirect racial profiling.
It is unlikely that such a pattern would be observed by chance. Some are noise
and do not comport with either a pattern or with an easy explanation of
discrimination. But when coefficients are deemed significant at the 95 percent
level, the results are not just noise. The sheer number of significant and negative
interactions across the RS factors suggests that race plays an important role not
simply in the formation of suspicion, but in the accuracy of that suspicion when it
comes to imposing sanctions or finding contraband on those stopped.
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Race and Stop Interactions

We examine two measures of police-suspect interaction during stops: use
of force and frisk. Frisks are not neutral.167 They can be prophylactic to discover
the presence of weapons that might endanger the officer’s safety. But they also
can go well beyond the public safety rationale to become a method of coercion
and a precursor to physical abuse. Accordingly, we assessed racial disparities in the
use of frisk, using the estimation methods that informed the analyses of
sanctions. To sort out the effect of race and ethnicity on the use of frisks, estimates
were generated separately for three categories of suspect frisk: (1) Any Frisk, (2)
Extra Frisk (frisks where there is no indication that officer safety was compromised
by a suspected violent or weapons crime or a RS factors indicating violence), and
(3) Unproductive Frisk (frisks that led to neither a subsequent search nor to a
criminal sanction.
We also examined two categories of force, Any Force and Extra Force. The
former is straightforward and includes all of the types of force listed on the UF250. Extra Force was identified as the force used when the officer reported
neither the suspicion of a violent crime nor the presence of a weapon. The
definitions and base rates of each type of frisk or force are shown in Table 9.

167. The Terry Court noted the inherent costs and potential for social and psychological injury in
frisks:
While the frequency with which “frisking” forms a part of field interrogation
practice varies tremendously with the locale, the objective of the interrogation,
and the particular officer . . . it cannot help but be a severely exacerbating factor
in police-community tensions. This is particularly true in situations where
the “stop and frisk” of youths or minority group members is “motivated by
the officers’ perceived need to maintain the power image of the beat officer,
an aim sometimes accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts to
undermine police control of the streets.”
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.11 (1968) (citing LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY, DONALD M. MCINTYRE,
JR. & DANIEL L. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 47–48 (1967)). See also Abigail A. Sewell,
Kevin A. Jefferson & Hedwig Lee, Living Under Surveillance: Gender, Psychological Distress,
and Stop-Question-and-Frisk Policing in New York City, 159 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1 (2016); Erin
Cooley, Neil Hester, William Cipolli, Laura I. Rivera, Kaitlin Abrams, Jeremy Pagan, Samuel
R. Sommers & Keith Payne, Racial Biases in Officers’ Decisions to Frisk Are Amplified for Black
People Stopped Among Groups Leading to Similar Biases in Searches, Arrests, and Use of Force,
11 SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 761 (2020).
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Table 9. Frisk and Force Categories
Measure

Definition

Mean

S.D.

Frisk

Any Frisk

.522

.500

Extra Frisk

Frisk when no suspicion of
weapon or violence

.238

.426

Unproductive Frisk

Frisk with no search or seizure

.400

.490

Force

Any Force

.229

.420

Extra Force

Force when no suspicion of
weapon or violence

.018

.135

N=4,086,118

Table 9 shows the general futility of frisks and the commonplace use of
force when force would not be indicated. Nearly half (45.5 percent) of frisks
qualified as extra frisks by our definition, and over three-fourths (76.6 percent)
were unproductive. Table 10 shows the results of regressions to test whether
this futility was specific to specific racial or ethnic groups. The effects of race
were estimated for each measure of frisk and force with and without
interactions of suspect race by the RS factors. If RS factors as reported by officers
were racially stereotyped, we would expect differences both in the magnitude and
significance of the main effects of suspect race and the five appearance-based (and
more subjective) RS factors. We report the results in Table 10.
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In each model for frisk, Black, Black Latinx, and white Latinx suspects were
more likely to be frisked, whether Any Frisk or an Unproductive Frisk.
Comparing the first two models—Any Frisk—in Table 10, the estimates for the
models with RS factor interactions are higher for all three race and ethnic
groups. The risk of a frisk for Black suspects increases from 5.3 percent higher
without RS factor interactions to 7.2 percent with RS factor interactions included
in the model (recall that the RS factor interactions are compared to the omitted RS
factor of Fit Description). Similar increases were found for Black Hispanic and
white Hispanic suspects. The main effects for the RS factors also increased across
the two models, but generally by smaller increments. We find the same results for
the models of Unproductive Frisk: increases in the risk of an unproductive frisk
when the RS*race interactions are included.
Accordingly, for these two models, the differences in the race effects when
RS*race interactions are included suggest that suspicion may be stereotyped for
Black and Latinx suspects. Recall that overall, and including the subset of stops
where officers frisked the suspect, the returns from frisks and searches were
extraordinarily low: firearms were seized in .01 percent of all stops, knives in 1.0
percent of all stops, and other contraband in 2 percent of all stops. Relying on
stereotypes of suspicion to conduct a frisk or search, whether or not objective
suspicion (for example, suspected weapon or violence) is present, deepens the
burden imposed on Black and Latinx suspects in the program of stops and frisk.
And, as the Floyd court pointed out, relying on stereotypes in lieu of individualized
and articulable suspicion raises essential constitutional problems.
The results in Table 11 suggest that Any Force is used more often for Black
and Latinx suspects than for white suspects. For Any Force, as in the frisk models,
the estimates by race increase when RS*race interactions are included. Whether
force reflects a discretionary decision or is the product of a negative officer-suspect
interaction use of the appearance-based RS factors as the basis for the stop appears
to be stereotyped and leads to an increase in the use of force. The risks for Black
suspects, for example, increase from 1.7 percent to 2.7 percent in the use of any
force. For Black Latinx suspects, we observed similar increases in risk when the
appearance-based RS*race interactions were included.
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But the results for Extra Force, when RS*race interactions are included,
suggest no discrimination by race in the use of force in discretionary stops. In
fact, the Extra Force models in Table 11 suggest that officers are no more likely
to use force with Black, Black Hispanic, or white Hispanic suspects as compared
to white suspects, but only when force may be unwarranted by the circumstances
of the stop. It seems that there is an increased risk of force when the
circumstances of the stop are broad and behaviorally inchoate and that those
risks are increased generally by the use of subjective RS factors. One lesson of
this analysis is that racial disparities in the use of force are preventable when the
force is narrowed to the very specific circumstances of the potential risk of
violence. Knowing how to prevent the use of force is important for avoiding
trouble that may ensue from force, including injuries to both suspects and police,
civilian complaints and officer discipline, and litigation.
F.

Do Officers Update?

Theories of rational behavior assume that actors make decisions where the
benefits of their acts exceed their costs or losses. If those expected costs and
benefits change over time, behavior will change accordingly as actors learn and
internalize the parameters of success and failure. In the context of proactive
policing, police stops that achieve any of several goals—constitutional compliance,
stops that lead to lawful and productive arrests or summonses, stops that lead to
seizures of weapons, drugs, or other contraband, or stops that produce goodwill
and citizen cooperation—should signal to officers the features of a stop that
increase its rewards or benefits. The Terry Court emphasized that experience, not
mere hunches, should guide officers in their discretion to stop and frisk
individuals.168 Having formed a subjective estimate of success (prior beliefs),
officers will observe their outcomes in subsequent encounters and form updated
probability estimates, with specific features of the event, with a positive weight on
those features. Officers should also learn the features of unproductive stops and
adjust accordingly. A rational actor would pursue good stops and avoid
unproductive stops by updating their knowledge of these features through
experience.169
Prior analyses of hit rates suggested that that “stops of whites are more
‘efficient’ and are more likely to lead to arrests, whereas those for [B]lacks and

168. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
169. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976).
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Latinx suspects are more indiscriminate,” in that a greater percentage of stopped
whites converted into arrests than stopped Black and Latinx suspects.170 Since
officers are likely to make several stops over their years of service, a theory of a
rational actor would learn to become more efficient in making stops and more
effective in pursuing Terry’s crime control mission. Accordingly, we exploited the
availability of deidentified officer identification numbers to estimate updating or
learning in the conduct of stops by specifying models based on changes in hit rates
(and failures) to seize weapons or contraband in the past month or to make arrests
or issue summons. The analysis is limited to officers who have made one or more
stops and examines both arrests and summons or weapons seizure over their stop
careers.
Across their career, the median stops per officer were 106 for all officers
regardless of the length of time in the panel. The lowest 10th percentile of
officers made only 6 stops over the study period and the 90th percentile made
419 stops. Approximately 8150 officers made only one stop over the course of the
study period. Approximately 2400 officers made over 419 stops.171

170. Gelman, Fagan & Kiss, supra note 67, at 820.
171. The low hit rates for officers overall may reflect the fact that not all officers are present
throughout the entire study period. Some are only present for a few months or years, and so
could not practically make a substantial number of stops.
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Figure 8: Hit Rates by Career Stops

Figure 8 is the distribution of hit rates for the two primary outcomes:
arrests/summons and seizure of weapons/contraband. For arrests and
summons, there is a steady decline in hit rates as officer activity increases over
their stop careers. The regression line in Figure 8 shows a decline from a hit rate
of 10 percent for officers making fewer than 25 stops across their careers to less
than 5 percent for officers making more than 80 stops in their stop careers. In
fact, the regression line is skewed upward by a small number of outliers at the
upper end of the distribution. For weapons and contraband, hit rates appear to
be insensitive to the total number of stops in an officer’s stop career. The average
hit rate declines slightly from approximately 2.5 percent overall at the low end of
the distribution of stops across an officer’s career to about 1.5 percent for officers
at the upper end of the stop distribution.
The models in Table 12 tested whether officers improved their hit rates over
each prior two month period, controlling for suspect race and the RS factors, as
well as total stop activity during the prior two-month period. The study
population was 485,086 stops made by 25,044 officers over the nine-year study
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interval, with each officer’s stop activity estimated each month.172 Suspect race
included a combined Black and Hispanic measure (called Non-White in the
table) and used an aggregate hit rate measure. Three models were estimated: a
base rate model for all officers, a second regression that included only suspect race,
and a third model incorporating the RS factors. The third model tests whether
officers are updating and improving their hit rates based on applying the indicia of
reasonable suspicion. Controls for year and precinct were included in the
regressions.
In the stop and frisk regime, it seems that officers are not updating. In fact,
the negative coefficients suggest that officers do worse over each successive twomonth period. The results are unchanged over the three models, including
controls for RS factors. Adding the RS factors in Model 3 suggests significant but
very weak improvements over models that average over those indicia of suspicion.
Including those measures did not provide evidence that even when following
prescriptions for reasonable suspicion, they were able to learn from successes and
errors.

172. The number of officers making one or more stops in each year in the study period ranged from
a high of 23,193 in 2005 to 17,861 in 2007. In 2012, the last year in the panel, 17,945 officers
made one or more stops.
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Table 12. Change in Officers' Hit Rate from Previous 2 Months, Officers
with >=5 Stops in Past Two Months (B, SE, p)

Predictors
Lag2 Hit Rate

Base
B (SE) p

Race
B (SE) p

-.457 ***
(.001)

-.446 ***
(.006)
.000
(.002)
-.012 *
(.006)

Race + RS
Factors %
B (SE) p

.000
(.003)

.000
(.003)

-.446
(.006)
-.001
(.001)
-.010
(.006)
.0003
(.000)
.003
(.0009)
.005
(.0007)
-.006
(.0007)
-.016
(.0008)
.007
(.0009)
.009
(.001)
.009
(.001)
.007
(.002)
.000
(.001)
.009
(.003)

Observations
465,086
R-squared
.211
Year FE?
Yes
Precinct FE?
Yes
Robust FE?
Yes
Cluster SE by PCT?
Yes
Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

465,086
.211
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

465,086
.213
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Non-White Suspect
Non-White * δ lag2 Hit Rate
Total RS Factors
% Stops with Fits Description
% Stops with Evasive/Furtive
% Stops with Crime Location
% Stops with Casing
% Stops with Other
% Stops with Drug Transaction
% Stops with Suspicious Object
% Stops with Criminal Appearances
% Stops with Violent Crime
Constant

***

*
**
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

***
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The combination of the results gives credence to Andrew Taslitz’s assertion
that “[p]olice may [] suffer from inappropriately extrapolating from past results
when they have insufficient information to identify a trend or an important
factual distinction.”173 Officers, even those with significant experience, make
generalizations from a small sample of data; hindsight and confirmation bias can
cloud officers’ recollections of what made a specific event suspicious. And they
rarely received feedback on past accuracy rates.174
Perhaps the institutional pressures within the NYPD to conduct stops as a
measure of productivity created the high rate of stops and their low productivity
in terms of sanctions and seizures.175 One reason may be the use of stops as an
activity generator institutionally, whose logic is distinct and detached from the
successes that may occur. The effects are greater for Black and Hispanic suspects
than white suspects, suggesting that activity generation is concentrated in
neighborhoods with larger Black and Hispanic populations as opposed to business
districts or lower crime places. This raises questions about the overall goal of the
stop regime—crime control or institutional design considerations related to
activity.

IV.

DISCUSSION

Equilibrium models of racial discrimination in law enforcement
encounters suggest that in the absence of racial discrimination, the proportion of
searches yielding evidence of illegal activity (the hit rate) will be equal across races.
Searches that disproportionately target one racial group, resulting in a relatively
low hit rate, are likely to be inefficient and suggest bias. An unbiased officer who
is seeking to maximize her hit rate would reduce the number of unproductive
stops toward a group with a lower hit rate. An unbiased policing regime would
generate no differences in hit rates between groups.
We used this framework to test for racial discrimination in pedestrian stops
with data from the contentious “Stop, Question and Frisk” (SQF) program of the
173. Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities for,
Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 44
(2010).
174. Eugenio Garrido & Jaume Masip & Carmen Herrero, Police Officers’ Credibility Judgments:
Accuracy and Estimated Ability, 39 INT’L J. PSYCH. 254, 256, 267–68 (2004) (noting that
“throughout their career police officers rarely receive any feedback indicating that their
credibility judgments are inaccurate”).
175. See JOHN A. ETERNO & ELI B. SILVERMAN, THE CRIME NUMBERS GAME: MANAGEMENT BY
MANIPULATION (2012); Nathaniel Bronstein, Police Management and Quotas: Governance in the
CompStat Era, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 543 (2015); Fagan & Geller, supra note 70.
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New York City Police Department (NYPD). SQF produced nearly five million
citizen stops from 2004–2012. The stops are regulated by both Terry (federal) and
DeBour (New York) case law on reasonable suspicion. Stops are well documented,
including a structured format for reporting the indicia of reasonable suspicion that
motivated the stop. We exploit these data to examine the Floyd court’s claim. We
decompose stops on the basis of suspicion, as reported by officers at the time of the
stop.
We conducted five tests to assess whether racial discrimination
characterizes SQF stops: the allocation of officers relative to crime and population
in specific areas, the decision to sanction conditional on a stop, the decision to
arrest or issue a summons conditional on the decision to sanction, the efficiency of
stops in seizing contraband including weapons, and updating processes by officers
in their search activity. In each test, we include the reasonable suspicion rationale
that officers indicated as the basis of the stop. We find consistent evidence of
disparities in police responses to Black, Latinx, and Black Latinx civilians, and
significant differences by race in the use of specific indicia of reasonable suspicion
that motivate stops. The higher error rates for specific indicia of suspicion suggest
that rather than individualized bases of suspicion, officers may be activating
stereotypes and archetypes to articulate suspicion and justify street seizures.
Finally, it seems that officers fail to learn from their successes and failures in
the conduct of stops. In fact, over the course of their stop careers, officers appear
to be less successful as the extent of their stop activity increases. We discuss
potential explanations in this Part, focusing on the institutional choices that
animated the stop and frisk program and the costs they imposed on civilians in
terms of racial bias and street detentions. These costs illustrate what the Terry
Court warned about: stops made on hunches that impose petty indignities on
largely innocent nonwhite populations.
A.

Police Allocation, Bias, and Agency Choice

Police are allocated to precincts proportionately to their local crime rates,
but often at rates higher than the crime rate would predict.176 Allocation
decisions ought to be equitable based on local crime conditions but defining and
estimating crime conditions is often shaded by the politics of crime and policing,
as well as the prejudices of police officers and their executives. Egon Bittner’s

176. See Fagan, supra note 71; Wheeler, supra note 94.
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prediction bears out in this study: we find that precincts with higher proportions
of Black residents and Black Latinx residents have higher concentrations of police
officers after controlling for their local crime rates.177 In other words, relative to
crime rates, or the demand for police services from residents, Black and Latinx
neighborhoods are overpoliced as evidenced by their marginally greater
allocations of officers than their crime rates alone would predict. Perhaps the
marginally higher allocation of police relative to crime animates the elevated rate
of unproductive stops. We expect a rational allocation of police activity to match
variation in times and places of local crime rates, and we observe that to be the
case.178 But the worry is that we also observe a marginal effect of racial composition
in police precincts, suggesting statistical discrimination or perhaps
institutionalized biases in the allocation of police to those areas.179
The allocation of police plays a central role in the exposure of persons to
police contact; these allocation data may indicate an overexposure risk for Black
and Latinx residents. This exposure is further shaped by the tactical policing
model that structures the extent and nature of those contacts. We would therefore
predict that these neighborhoods and the individuals in the neighborhoods may
be subject to inaccurate or overstated predictions of crime rates.180 These

177. Egon Bittner, The Functions of Police in Modern Society, in THINKING ABOUT POLICE 35, 38
(Carl B. Klockars & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1991) (“The ecological distribution of police
work at the level of departmentally determined concentrations of deployment, as well as the
orientation of individual police officers, reflects a whole range of public prejudices. . . . Though
this pattern of manpower allocation is ordinarily influenced by reference to experientially
established needs for police service, it inevitably entails the consequence that some persons will
receive the dubious benefit of extensive police scrutiny merely on account of their membership
in those social groupings which invidious social comparisons locate at the bottom of the
heap.”). See also Stephen D. Mastrofski, Race, Policing, and Equity, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 593 (2012).
178. To do otherwise, given constraints on police resources, would be to underserve other places.
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 72 (1990).
179. The drift toward algorithmic allocations raises the risks of such errors. See SARAH BRAYNE,
PREDICT AND SURVEIL (2021); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52
GA. L. REV. 109 (2017). See generally ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA
POLICING (2017) (critiquing the reliance of police managers on crime data alone in allocating
police to places while ignoring local and economic conditions). And for a discussion of the
conflict of error rates and law, see Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion
Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871 (2016).
180. Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and
Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15 (2016).

No Runs, Few Hits, and Many Errors

1665

predictions are memorialized into law,181 and their costs are externalized onto the
residents of and visitors to those places.182
One rationale for the skewed allocation of officers in this study is the
policing model. SQF and similar theories of policing require elevated rates of
contact between citizens and police, aggressive approaches to engage civilians in
questioning, and deeper intrusions including frisks and searches. New York City
was not alone in pursuing aggressive enforcement strategies that encouraged
contacts between citizens and police to disrupt crime events and patterns.183 The
research on its effectiveness shows mixed evidence, with results sensitive to
features of study design.
Is this evidence of bias, or statistical discrimination? The data are not well
suited to resolve this question. Economist Kenneth Arrow described profiling as a
process of “positive valuation” of one group with a higher expected return, even if
that valuation is inflated.184 And we also see that the greater exposure of local
residents or visitors to police officers can raise the ex-post probability of one or
more stops of those civilians—mainly people of color—within each calendar
quarter.
Terry’s reasonable suspicion doctrine fails to regulate the
constitutionality of those stops, deferring to the preferences of police actors and
their experience and intuitions. But the error rates identified in this study
suggest that these valuations do next to nothing to enhance the ability of police to
seize weapons or control violent crime. This is not to say that a positive security181. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (holding that “a ‘high crime area’ [is] among
the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis”) (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 144, 147–48 (1972)).
182. See Grunwald & Fagan, supra note 79; Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere
Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REV. 407, 433 (2006) (disputing the Wardlow Court’s conclusion that a
suspect loitering in a high crime area suffices for the particularized evidence required by the
Terry Court). See generally Meares, supra note 2 (critiquing the blanketing of neighborhoods
with officers encouraged to effect Terry stops while averaging suspicion across the local
population).
183. See Harmon & Manns, supra note 35; see also NAT’L ACADS. SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note
5, at 41–61 (describing a taxonomy of proactive models, including place-based approaches,
problem-solving approaches, person-focused strategies, including the mass approach of stop
and frisk in New York, and selective approaches of micro-places and individuals, including
focused deterrence).
184. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3
(Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973); Fagan, Braga, Brunson & Pattavina, supra note
7373, at 613 (“Arrow describes sources of ‘cheap information’ that might help a decision maker
to identify a discrimination target [at] a low cost: skin color, poor neighborhoods, or other
substitutes for crime. These sources of cheap information may also prime decision makers—
police officers, in this case—to increase their valuation of the suspect’s behavior. Since there is
no cost [to the officer] for a wrong decision, there are only weak incentives to correct or update
that information.”).
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generating regime is unattainable,185 but the institutional design of the SQF
program created heavy burdens and risks for Black and Latinx residents subjected
to that regime while undermining the ability of officers to make careful choices.
Egon Bittner suggests that once placed in a high crime area, the preferences of
individual officers then produce a body of encounters that may be disproportionate
to the actual risks, or at the least, the product of wrong “hunches” or errors in
reading the signals of suspicion that are contextualized into the perception of the
area.186 If placed in what their department characterizes as a high crime area,
officers will be primed to see suspicion.187 And instead of seeing disorder,188
Bittner’s experience is that they see the invidious “other”189 or the “symbolic
assailant.”190 Officers are in turn are primed to see generalized group-based
criminality rather than individualized assessments of criminal conduct. If
suspicion primes officers to believe that crime is prevalent in a space, they will see
criminal risk generally among in the individuals who live and work in that space.
The errors rampant in the Terry regime of stop and frisk in New York City may
well be the product of this narrowing and shaping of perceptions and attributions
to see criminality.
B.

Low Hit Rates as Evidence of the Burden Black and Latinx Suspects Bear

Once stopped, Blacks and Black Latinx suspects are less likely to be
sanctioned. They also are less likely to have contraband when stopped. Rather
than indicating the absence of bias, this pattern suggests that bias is evident in the
very large number of unproductive stops, or false positives and in the uneven
allocation of the burdens of temporary detention and deprivation of liberty that
ensue from a stop. In litigation, the Floyd court cited this intersection of high error
rates and disproportionate rates of stops of Black and Latinx persons as evidence of
“indirect racial profiling.”191 The Floyd court defined a second form of indirect

185. See Goel, Perelman, Shroff & Sklansky, supra note 141.
186. The Terry Court abhorred hunches, seeing this as one of the Achilles heels of the doctrine.
Lerner, supra note 182, at 418 (“Ironically, the major innovation and lasting impact of the Terry
decision was its disparagement of mere hunches.”). Lerner goes further, stating that Chief
Justice Warren’s decision to place hunches in quotations suggested that hunches cannot be
probative evidence at all. Id. at 421.
187. See Samaha, supra note 18; see also Sampson, supra note 77; Graham & Lowery, supra note 84.
188. See Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 18.
189. Bittner, supra note 177.
190. SKOLNICK, supra note 85.
191. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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profiling, the targeting of individuals based on the aggregate characteristics of local
crime suspect data,192 a practice that the court then characterized as “intentional
discrimination based on race.”193 Judge Shira Scheindlin also cited evidence that
the police had an unwritten policy to stop “the right people.”194 The City argued
that stops were based on the racial makeup of crime suspects in the area.195 The
City’s statistical argument failed in two ways: the lower rate of seizures of firearms
and other weapons from the profiled racial groups,196 and the absence of “evidence
that law-abiding [B]lacks or Hispanics are more likely to behave objectively more
suspiciously than law-abiding whites.”197 In effect, then, the defense of this regime
was itself a racially biased explanation198 and an acknowledgment of race-based
suspicion.199
Kent Greenawalt questions the constitutional and moral basis of police
officers interpreting a person’s race in deciding whether to make a stop and then
whether to engage in a frisk (which is permissible only given a perceivable risk that
the person stopped is carrying a weapon).200 He carefully parses the question of
race-based suspicion and whether there are circumstances where this may be
permissible under law. The answer is complicated and turns on whether there is
an objective basis to take race into account as in a suspect description. But in
the context of law, it is better, given the conflicts over racial categorization, to
permit race as a category of suspicion if and only if it is constitutionally
required.201 It almost never is. The only common area in which the law is
required to make racial distinctions is in Fourteenth Amendment litigation where
racial categorization is necessary to make findings on disparate impact and
intentional discrimination.202

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

200.
201.
202.

Id. at 560.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 560–61.
Id. at 560. The City's experts claimed that the race of crime suspects is the appropriate
benchmark for measuring racial bias in stops. Id.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 587.
See Morrow & Shjarback, supra note 83 (noting that the view of discrimination as endogenous
to the institutional design of proactive policing is distinct and somewhat opposed to the claim
that unconscious bias, culture, and police officers’ worldviews contribute to racial disparities
in prearrest street policing).
Kent Greenawalt, Probabilities, Perceptions, Consequences and “Discrimination”: One Puzzle
About Controversial “Stop and Frisk,” 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 181, 183 (2014).
Id. at 184.
See N.Y. OFF. ATT’Y GEN., supra note 137; KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 163. See also
NATAPOFF, supra note 163. In the Attorney General report, the authors point out that the
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Apart from the constitutional failure to regulate the stop and frisk regime, the
dignitarian and psychological burdens it imposes on nonwhite civilians, and the
bias toward punitive outcomes of stops of nonwhite suspects compared to
whites, the practice simply fails to achieve its goals of identifying would-be
offenders and disrupting crime. The regime suggests a failure to constitutionally
regulate and cabin Terry’s expansion of discretion to effect Fourth Amendment
seizures. The Floyd court conservatively estimated that, at a minimum, 25 percent
of all stops were either unjustified or relied on an indeterminate stop narrative to
meet constitutional standards.203 In other studies, the rate reached 45 percent of
all stops,204 suggesting a structural failure in Terry’s construction of reasonable
suspicion to meet constitutional demands for liberty and dignity interests.
Whether officers are constrained by their understanding of the RS factors implicit
in Terry and DeBour, or whether the construction of reasonable suspicion itself is
flawed, is a critical question.
C.

The SQF Program Instantiated Race Into Suspicion

The application of suspicion factors by suspect race and ethnicity suggests
that officers draw from “scripts of suspicion” to justify stops.205 This is the opposite
of individualized and articulable suspicion required by state and federal law.
Because scripts of suspicion homogenize the bases of stops, the capacity for

second dimension of bias is evident in the racialized pattern of sanction preferences among
officers. Once the officer decides to sanction, Black and Latinx suspects are more likely to
receive a harsher sanction—arrest—compared to white suspects. White suspects more often
receive summons, which are less intrusive and carry less restrictive forms of punishment.
We observe this after controlling for the selection of individuals for any sanction and after
controlling for the suspected crime. The burdens from these decisions are not trivial. The
costs associated with an arrest, even for a minor charge, include temporary detention, a fine, or
often a guilty plea simply to avoid a longer spell of incarceration. Analyses of the fate of these
arrests suggests that nearly half fail to result in a conviction, suggesting additional burdens on
defendants who endure what Issa Kohler-Hausmann describes as a managerial process, in
which adjudication of guilt is secondary to the processing of low-level cases.
203. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 582. The Floyd court also identified several reasons for why the
rate of constitutionally unjustified stops may be higher than stated by plaintiffs. “The finding
that [the] stop factor analysis likely significantly undercounts the number of unjustified stops.”
Id.
204. When officers record narratives in text strings, they are more likely to record stop rationales
that fail to meet minimal constitutional standards under the Fourth Amendment. See
Plaintiffs’ Fifth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices, Bailey v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 2:10-cv-05952-SD (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2015). See, e.g., Jon B. Gould & Stephen
D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution, 3
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 333 (2004).
205. See Fagan & Geller, supra note 70, at 51.
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accuracy and differentiation may be lost. A script of suspicion that is irrelevant to
objective and observable suspect behavior, but that would justify a seizure and
detention of a suspect, is nonetheless a pathway to unfettered government
conduct that is not both unproductive to public safety and normatively troubling.
Even more troubling are the effects of the race-suspicion nexus on stop outcomes.
Put simply, if an element of suspicion is more often applied to Black and Latinx
suspects than whites, and if that nexus leads to unproductive outcomes, then the
Terry regime in the stop and frisk context instantiates race into suspicion, with
dignitarian and legal costs to suspects. And this nexus is deepened by the excess
allocation of police officers by neighborhood racial composition.
How does this process work? Reasonable suspicion credits the experience
of police officers, yet that experience is formed on the basis of exposure to civilians
in neighborhoods with Black and Hispanic residents. The narrowing of the gaze
of police to Black and Latinx neighborhoods, as reflected in the failure of the
indicia of suspicion to narrow and direct police power to settings where—in
Terry’s language—crime is afoot. The volume of statistically significant negative
interactions between police and Black and Latinx civilians also suggests both
inaccuracy and inefficiency in the formation of suspicion and demonstrates that
the burdens of the program again fall largely on Black and Latinx suspects.
Therefore, running a programmatic Terry regime with logic that permits and
even encourages the development of scripts suggests that the disparities and
constitutional problems, such as indirect profiling, were foreseeable and perhaps
inevitable.
What, then, to make of the scheme of reasonable suspicion that was
instantiated in the stop and frisk regime in the Floyd litigation? Black and Latinx
persons were the subjects of more than eight stops in ten. The suspicion factors
that drove those stops often proved inaccurate predictors of criminal activity.
The stops took place in predominantly Black and Latinx neighborhoods at rates
that exceeded what the local crime rate would predict.206 These factors were
invoked by officers after concluding a stop and articulated at some time later when
completing the stop form. The interval allowed officers to reconstruct a rationale
for the stop, or a script207
Again, officers are primed to see generalized criminality rather than
individualized criminal conduct. In turn, the categories of suspicion serve as racial

206. Fagan Report, supra note 14, at 33–45; see also Fagan & Davies, supra note 78.
207. Fagan & Geller, supra note 70, at 60–61; see also Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 581–82 (noting
“credible evidence of scripting in the UF-250s of officers who testified at trial”).
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proxies for that criminality.208 Each stop allows for a reproduction of the proxy
process. Therefore, the categories of suspicion as racial proxy opened the door to
bias both in the stops themselves and in the Reasonable Suspicion factors invoked
to justify them.
The Floyd court noted that officers were subject to performance quotas that
required them to hunt for targets either without suspicion or by categorically
applying suspicion to persons fitting the profile of “the right people.”209 At least one
police officer described the search for suspects to be stopped as hunting.210 A former
officer noted that success in hunting can enhance an officer’s career by helping
superiors reach managerial quotas without legal or social costs, turning police
precincts into “capital markets.”211 In this way, the hunt for suspects using
racialized proxies of suspicion becomes endogenous to the police culture.
Discrimination, in this organizational and cultural milieu, can become integral
to the mission of the institution when group-based or collective suspicion replaces
the individualized suspicion that caselaw demands.
But there are more fundamental challenges to discerning the revealed
preferences of police and to detecting discrimination. But there are more
fundamental challenges to discerning the revealed preferences of police and to
detecting discrimination. In a recent study of traffic enforcement in San Diego,
officers "denied, minimized, or even condemned racial profiling" in traffic stops,
despite being shown robust empirical evidence of racially disparate policing."212
Officers insisted that they acted under a neutral policy of colorblindness, and
invoked a litany of excuses and justifications for the use of race in their everyday
208. See generally Catherine M. Grosso, Jeffrey Fagan, Michael Laurence, David Baldus, George
Woodworth & Richard Newell, Death by Stereotype: Race, Ethnicity, and California’s Failure
to Implement Furman’s Narrowing Requirement, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1394 (2019) (arguing that,
similar to the racialized use of suspicion indica by police, racial stereotypes are endowed in
death penalty eligibility in California, in turn reproducing discrimination that is endemic to
each stage of criminal justice decision making).
209. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
210. Id. at 597–98 (quoting a sergeant who stated that “‘you can always articulate’” some basis for a
stop after the fact, encouraging officers to stop first and develop a justification later); see also
Joseph Goldstein & Ashley Southall, I Got Tired of Hunting Black and Hispanic People, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/ nyregion/nyc-police-subwayracial-profiling.html [https://perma.cc/JFS2-ZTGN].
211. Bronstein, supra note 175, at 571. Bronstein notes that quotas of stops with scripted or even
threadbare suspicion can provide a “low-impact way for a police department supervisor to
manage his officers’ discretion and willingness to work.” Id. at 552, 571.
212. Megan Welsh, Joshusa Chanin, and Stuart Henry, Complex Colorblindedness in Police
Processes and Practices, 68 SOC. PROBLEMS 374, 386-7 (2021) (showing a disjuncture between
officers' claims of racial neutrality and their use of racially dehumanizing narratives about
people and places to describe their police work).
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police work. Welsh and colleagues report demeaning racialized characterizations
of the people and communities they police, despite their morally neutral accounts
of their actions and decisions.
In fact, the task required to record the bases of suspicion in this context,
however scripted or fictitious, challenges both the observer and the analyst to sort
out the psychological and social processes inherent in the processing of behavioral
observation and information. Is there racial animus, or a taste for discrimination,
on top of the racialized coding of suspicion? Consider that officers record the bases
of the stop after the stop has taken place and reached its conclusion. There may
have been numerous interactions in that event, some are reciprocal in a chain of
contingent events, and the tone and interaction may change over time during a
stop lasting several minutes.213 In some instances, tensions between officer and
suspect can rise and fall in a series of verbal exchanges and assertions of authority
by the officer and innocence by the suspect. Perceptions of suspicion and
attributions of meaning, including perceived disrespect from suspect to officer, are
likely to be filtered through cognitive frameworks that may be distorted by fear,
arousal, or even disgust toward the suspect.214 Or, they may be motivated and
incentivized by the institutional values that reward the use of inchoate suspicion
with no social or legal cost. The surroundings and suspect demeanor matter
too, each of which can alter perceptions as well as an officer’s emotional state
before and during a stop. In this sense, the racialized proxies of suspicion lead to
hypervigilance and fear.215 The combination of indifference and fear in the
exercise of legal power is antithetical to constitutional and effective policing.
CONCLUSION
Using several extensions of an equilibrium model and including a set of
alternate outcome measures, we find persistent evidence of racial
discrimination. It is present both in the outcomes of events and in the perceptual
bases of actions within those events once we control for the bases of suspicion and
other attributes of the stop. The Floyd court cited evidence of the failure of
213. See, e.g., The Young Turks, Teen Called “F***king Mutt” in Stop and Frisk, YOUTUBE, at 0:00–
3:17 (Oct. 10, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c1Dr-hMCy78 [https://
perma.cc/FC3Y-RRC7]. The tone changes from moment to moment, from calm
explanation to rage and physical aggression by the officer. Id.
214. Seth Stoughton, Law Enforcement’s “Warrior” Problem, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 225, 226–28
(2015) (describing the mental tenacity and attitude of officers to adopt to a constant lifethreatening struggle with suspects in the face of constant precarity in a hostile task
environment, because “everyone they meet may have a plan to kill them”).
215. The Young Turks, supra note 213.
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constitutional regulation and the burden it created on Black and Hispanic
civilians. Our analyses suggest that perhaps the Floyd court understated the extent
and pervasiveness of different processes of race discrimination and the
institutional designs that led to them. The negative externalities of mistakes for
those stopped suggest that this is important for law and policy.
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APPENDIX B. TOTAL STOPS BY NYPD PRECINCT, 2006
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APPENDIX C. CRIME CLASSIFICATION
Aggregate Category Suspected Offenses
Murder
Violent Crime

Marijuana Possession

Murder
Aggravated Assault
Aggravated Harassment
Aggravated Sexual Abuse
Assault
Kidnapping
Rape
Robbery
Harassment
Hazing
Jostling
Menacing
Reckless Endangerment
Resisting Arrest
Riot
Unlawful Imprisonment
Vehicular Assault
Criminal Possession of Controlled Substances
Criminal Sale of Controlled Substances
Criminal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia
Other Drug Offenses
Criminal Possession of Marijuana

Marijuana Sale

Criminal Sale of Marijuana

Part I Property Crime

Arson
Burglary
Grand Larceny
Grand Larceny Auto
Auto Stripping
Computer Trespass
Criminal Possession of Stolen Property
Criminal Mischief
Criminal Possession of Computer Materials
Criminal Possession of Forged Instruments
Criminal Tampering
Misapplication of Property
Petit Larceny
Possession of Burglar Tools
Reckless Endangerment of Property
Theft of Services
Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle

Minor Violent Crime

Hard Drug Crime

Minor Property Crime
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Fraud and Related
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Trespass

Falsifying Business Records
Forgery
Forgery of a VIN
Fraud
Fraudulent Accosting
Insurance Fraud
Tampering with a Public Record
Unlawful Use of Credit Card, Debit
Criminal Trespass

Prostitution

Prostitution

Terrorism

Terrorism

Quality of Life/Disorder

Eavesdropping
Fortune Telling
Gambling
Loitering
Making Graffiti
Obscenity
Obstructing Firefighting Operations
Obstructing Governmental Administration
Possession of Graffiti Instruments
Trademark Counterfeiting
Unlawfully Dealing with Fireworks
Unauthorized Recording
Unlawful Assembly
Disorderly Conduct
Quality of Life
Riding Bike on the Sidewalk
Alcohol Violation
Abortion
Adultery
Bigamy
Course of Sexual Conduct
Incest
Public Display of Offensive Sexual Material
Public Lewdness
Sexual Abuse
Sexual Misconduct
Sodomy
Forcible Touching
Other Minor Sex Crimes

Sex Crimes and Related

